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In both private and public justice systems, online dispute
resolution (ODR) technologies are profoundly affecting
people's access to justice and redress and the nature of their
procedural experiences. Automation and artificial intelligence
play a key role in delivering the promise of ODR. At the same
time, there are challenging normative and practical concerns
regarding the ability of "machine made justice" to meet
appropriate procedural and substantive standards. The article
presents a conceptual framework for evaluating the role of
technology in dispute resolution and its effect on procedural
justice. Subsequently, it proposes an instrument for evaluating
procedural justice experiences in ODR; and reports the results
of a study comparing the impact of automated (software-
powered) and human-powered online mediation and
arbitration on disputants' procedural justice experiences.
Finally, the article discusses the implications of its findings
on ODR process design, regulation, and practice, and calls for
updating the research agenda on these issues.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet technologies are transforming the way justice systems operate,
presenting new thrilling opportunities for delivering legal services, improving
access to justice, and providing redress. Previously used only for decomposed
outsourced tasks such as e-filing, online scheduling, or collaborative document
editing, online systems are now used to deliver comprehensive legal services,
from start to end. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) systems are at the
forefront of this trend, responsive to-and shaped by-the social and
technological changes of the digital age.
ODR systems are internet-based platforms that enable parties to a dispute
to complete the entire resolution process, from filing through final
determination, in an online environment.' Since the early 2000s, ODR systems
have been employed by both private and public justice systems to deliver a
variety of dispute resolution processes, including mediation, arbitration and
judicial proceedings.2 Today, world-over, ODR systems resolve cases by the
millions, handling disputes that originate both online and offline. They operate
in a wide array of legal domains, including: family disputes, small claims,
consumer and commercial disputes, traffic penalties, and administrative
appeals.' For example, eBay's online "Resolution Center"' reportedly handles
over sixty million e-commerce disputes annually.' In England and Wales,
"Money Claim Online,"6 a judicial ODR platform for fixed sum claims of up
to E100,000, issues more such claims than any other local county court; and
' There are different definitions of ODR in the literature. See Introduction, in ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 3 (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al, eds.)
(2012).
'See Ethan Katsh, ODR: A Look at History, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al., eds.) (2012).
3 For a review and analysis of current ODR systems and models, see Ayelet Sela, The
Effect of Online Technologies on Dispute Resolution System Design: Antecedents, Current
Trends and Future Directions 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 635 (2017).
4 See Resolution Center, EBAY, http://resolutioncenter.ebay.com/ (Sept. 18, 2017).
' See Amy J. Schmitz & Colin Rule, THE NEW HANDSHAKE: ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 53 (2017); Colin Rule & Chittu
Nagarajan, Leveraging the Wisdom ofCrowds: The eBay Community Court and the Future
ofOnline Dispute Resolution ACRESOLUTION MAGAZINE (Winter 2010); Katsh, supra note
2, at 15; Bruce T. Cooper, Online Dispute Resolution Comes of Age, THE PRACTICAL
LITIGATOR 33, 35 (July, 2009) (All reporting the figure of 60 million annual disputes).
6 Money Claim, HM COURTS AND TRIBUNAL SERVICES,
https://www.moneyclaim.gov.uk (Sept. 18, 2017).
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the ODR system of the "Traffic Penalty Tribunal"' conducts the majority of
its appeal hearings exclusively online.8
The impact of ODR-and the importance of studying it-have been
significantly boosted by two recent trends. First, ODR systems are
increasingly institutionalized: several legal systems in North America and
Europe have launched judicial ODR systems;' and both the European Union
and the United Nations promoted the institution of cross-border ODR systems
for commercial disputes."o Second, there are constant growth and development
in the number of ODR systems and the richness of the technologies and
services they provide. The migration of dispute resolution processes to the
online space does not stop at transposing the interaction from a courtroom or
conference hall to a chat room. Reliance on information technology and
artificial intelligence paves the way for new conceptual models, process
structures, and forms of service delivery that were previously impossible.
Specifically, many ODR systems now incorporate automation technologies
such as expert systems, algorithmic resolutions and machine learning in order
to handle large volumes of disputes, reduce costs and personalize procedures
and outcomes."
' Traffic Penalty Online Appeal Entry Form, TRAFFIC PENALTY TRIBUNAL OF
ENGLAND AND WALES, http://www.trafficpenaltytribunal.gov.uk/want-to-appeal/ (Sept.
18, 2017).
8 See TRAFFIC PENALTY TRIBUNAL OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Annual Statistics Report
2014-2015, 7, https://www.trafficpenaltytribunal.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/1 I/TPTAnnualStatistics Report 14 15.pdf.pdf. (reporting that
68% of the hearings were conducted exclusively online).
' See, e.g., S.B.C., CHAPTER 25, CIv. RESOL. TRIBUNAL ACT, 25 S.B.C. (2012);
http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/12025_01 (instituting ODR for
small claims, traffic cases, and certain property cases); the Money Claim Online judicial
ODR platform (discussed supra note 6); and LORD JUSTICE BRIGGS, Civil Courts Structure
Review: Interim Report, JUDICIARY OF ENG. & WALES (December 2015)
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ccsr-interim-report-dec- 15-
finall.pdf. (recommending the establishment of an online court for claims up to £25,000).
1o See Council On Online Dispute Resolution For Consumer Reports Regulation No
524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on Online
Dispute: http://eur-ex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:
2013:165:0001:0012: EN:PDF; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNICITRAL) Rep. on its 43rd Session, U.N. DOC. A/65/17 at 257 (2010); UNICTRAL's
Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution):
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/commission/working_ groups/30nline
DisputeResolution.html.
" See Sela, supra note 3.
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For both its innovative potential and growing impact, ODR is considered
a "disruptive legal technology;"12 a par of an evolving "shift in legal
paradigm"3 that is poised to transform the legal marketplace and displace
many features of contemporary legal systems.14 Surprisingly, however, little
is known about the ways in which technology affects disputants, process and
outcome. More specific to the topic of this article:
Considering the amount of literature published by legal
scholars about ODR, it is quite surprising to notice that few
authors have dealt with ... the issue of human interaction ...
While the legal issues can easily be grasped and analyzed, it
is much more difficult to understand how ODR proceedings
are perceived by the stakeholders . . ."
Over four decades of research on dispute resolution systems established
that their appropriateness, legitimacy, and effectiveness greatly depend on
having reliable data about all their impacted stakeholders," and especially
12 See RICHARD SussKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF
LEGAL SERVICES 99-145 (2008) (identifying a non-exhaustive list of ten disruptive legal
technologies: automated document assembly, relentless connectivity, the electronic legal
marketplace, e-learning, online legal guidance, legal open-sourcing, closed legal
communities, workflow and project management, embedded legal knowledge, and online
dispute resolution). Typically, cheaper, simpler, smaller, and more convenient to use,
disruptive technologies have the potential to transform industries and markets by
challenging the way they operate.
13 RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW 97 (Revised edition, 1998), Richard
Susskind, TOMORROW'S LAWYERS: AN INTRODUCTION TO YOUR FUTURE (2013)
(suggesting that over the next two decades, legal institutions and lawyers are bound to
change more radically than they have over the last two centuries).
14 See Susskind supra note 12, 13; Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Balancing the Scales: The
Ford-Firestone Case, the Internet, and the Future Dispute Resolution Landscape 6 YALE
J. OF L. & TECH. 2, 21 (2004) ("internet society will ... alter the dispute resolution
landscape in fundamental ways").
" Philippe Gillidron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True
Fallacy? 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 301, 325-26 (2008).
6 See, e.g., Stephanie Smith & Janet K. Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEG. L. REv. 123 (2009); Lisa B. Bingham, Control Over
Dispute-System Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 221 (2004); Khalil Z. Shariff, Designing Institutions to Manage Conflict:
Principles for the Problem Solving Organization, 8 HARV.NEG. L. REV. 133 (2003). These
works echo the general principles laid out by: WILLIAM B. URY, JEANNE BRETT & STEPHEN
GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF
CONFLICT (1988); and CATHY A. COSTANTINO & CHRISTINA SICKLES MERCHANT,
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disputants." There is a rich literature that explores disputants' experiences in
court" and ADR 9 processes, primarily in terms of procedural justice. This
article expands this work to ODR and responds to the calls to understand how
ODR proceedings are perceived by the stakeholders.20 It examines
theoretically and empirically a central question in ODR: How reliance on
automation affects disputants' procedural justice experiences in two types of
ODR processes: binding arbitration and consensual mediation.
In ODR, "process" is a compound concept, comprised of both the dispute
resolution method (e.g. mediation or arbitration) and the properties of the
technology used for delivering it (e.g. text vs. video, synchronous vs.
asynchronous; automated vs. human-powered). Different combinations of
technology and method are expected to interact, resulting in potentially
divergent effects on disputants' procedural justice experiences.21 This article
DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE AND
HEALTHY ORGANIZATIONS (1996).
17 See also, Donna Shestowsky, Misjudging: Implications for Dispute Resolution, 7
NEV. L.J. 487, 490 (2007) (reviewing the literature on "how laypeople assess dispute
resolution procedures")
s See Tom R. Tyler, What Is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess
the Fairness ofLegal Procedures 22 L. & Soc. REV. 103, 128 (1988); E. Allan Lind et al.,
In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the Civil
Justice System, 24 L. & Soc. REV. 953 (1990); Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of
Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L.
REv. 637 (2014).
" See, e.g., Donna Shestowsky & Jeanne M. Brett, Disputants' Perceptions ofDispute
Resolution Procedures: An Ex Ante and Ex Post Longitudinal Empirical Study, 41 CONN.
L. REV 63 (2008); Nancy Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real
Conversations with Real Disputants about Institutionalized Mediation and its Value, 19
OHIO ST. J. DiSP. RESOL. 573 (2004); Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing
Three Processes Underlying Judgments ofProcedural Justice: A Field Study ofMediation
and Arbitration, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1167 (1993).
20 See Gillidron, supra note 15, at 326; Alan Gaitenby, The Fourth Party Rises:
Evolving Environments of Online Dispute Resolution, 38 U. TOL. L. REv 371-72 (2006)
(pointing out the need to "pay attention to tool users' behavior and perception of ODR
experiences"). A related project led by a team of European collaborators culminated in the
2012 publication of a handbook on measuring the costs and quality of ODR, which includes
a proposed framework for evaluating disputants' experiences in ODR. See Laura Klaming,
Quality of ODR Procedures, in COSTS AND QUALITY OF ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A
HANDBOOK FOR MEASURING THE COSTS AND QUALITY OF ODR, 143 (Martin Gramatikov,
ed.) (2012).
21 See also, Kathleen L. McGinn & Rachel Croson, What Do Communication Media
Mean for Negotiators? A Question of Social Awareness, in THE HANDBOOK OF
NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 334-37 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett, eds. 2004)
(proposing three principal properties of communication media that produce measureable
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explores the interaction between the degree of autonomy that the technology
possesses in the process and the degree of third-party decision control in the
dispute resolution method. In other words, all things being equal, it examines
whether in ODR, disputants' perception that the third-party is a person or an
artificially-intelligent software results in different procedural justice
experiences; and whether these experiences are sensitive to control over the
outcome by the disputants (consensual mediation) or the third-party (binding
arbitration).
Addressing this multi-faceted question requires accounting for its many
components. Section I introduces the distinction between instrumental and
principal ODR processes as a conceptual framework for evaluating the role
and autonomy of technology in dispute resolution processes. Subsequently, it
applies the framework to classify current ODR systems. Section II draws on
literature in dispute resolution, communication, human-computer interaction,
technology, psychology, procedural justice and philosophy, to consider how
instrumental and principal ODR may impact disputants' procedural justice
experiences. Section III reports the design, procedure and results of an
experiment testing how (perceived) software and human third-parties affect
disputants' procedural justice experiences in online mediation and arbitration.
Finally, Section IV discusses the implications of the findings and of the
developments in principal and instrumental ODR applications on the nature,
practice and regulation of ODR, calling for an updated research agenda on
these issues.
II. CONCEPTUALIZING THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN ODR
A. Technology as the Fourth Party
The key differentiator of ODR processes from their offline predecessors
is extensive reliance on information technology in the delivery of services.
While everyone agrees that ODR applications are more than "just software,"22
not everyone agrees in what sense this is the case. Proponents of ODR
typically argue that technology can make many dispute resolution processes
more accessible, easier, faster and less expensive to complete, and that it can
influences on social interaction, and hence, also dispute resolution: synchronicity,
multiple-channels, and high efficacy). See also, the discussion in section III below.
22 Gaitenby, supra note 20, at 372 (ODR tools are the product of individual and
collective consciousnesses empowered by a multitude of social, cultural and technical
tools).
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introduce new features that will improve the quality of the process. They
contend that the rapid technological advancements coupled with the growing
internet-immersion in people's day-to-day life make ODR a natural next step
in the evolution of dispute resolution.2 3 Critics of ODR, on the other hand,
argue that dispute resolution processes cannot be adequately conducted online
because "cyberspace is not a 'mirror image' of the physical world."24 They
fear that the claimed efficiencies of ODR come at the expense of procedural
quality, due to the limitations that the online environment imposes on human
communication. Privacy, confidentiality, and the neutrality of the online
interface are also causes for unease.25 Some commentators argue, therefore,
that ODR systems are justified only for simple, low-value disputes.26
To conceptualize the idea that ODR software plays a critical role in the
dispute resolution process, Katsh & Rifkin coined the term The Fourth Party.2 7
It suggests that the online space shapes the manner in which parties interact
23 See e.g. Ethan Katsh, Bringing Online Dispute Resolution to Virtual Worlds:
Creating Processes through Code, 49 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV 271 (2004); David Allen Larson,
Technology Mediated Dispute Resolution (TDMR): Opportunities and Dangers, 38 U. TOL
L. REV. 213 (2006-2007); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler & Thomas Schultz, ONLINE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTEMPORARY JUSTICE (2004); Jelle van
Veenen, From :-( to :-) Using Online Communication to Improve Dispute Resolution,
TISCO Working Paper No. 2/2010 (July 2010), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1618719.
24 Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace? 1998 BYU L. REV.
1305, 1308, 1310 (1998) (arguing that ODR has had a weakening negative effect on the
dispute resolution process).
2 5 See, e.g., id.; Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation, Democracy, and Cyberspace, 15 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619, 641 (2000) (discussing how mediators in online mediation may
not capture certain non-verbal cues, the process can be damaged. Examples include a
speaker's hesitation, a smile or frown, changes in tempo, and formality or informality in
one's demeanor and tone); Janice Nadler, Rapport in Legal Negotiation: How Small Talk
can Facilitate E-mail Dealmaking, 9 HARVARD NEGOT. L. REV. 223 (2004) (negotiating
via email can lead to misunderstandings, sinister attributions, and ultimately, impasse);
Ethan Katsh & Leah Wing, Ten Years ofOnline Dispute Resolution (ODR): Looking at the
Past and Constructing the Future, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 19, 41 (2006) (reviewing the key
criticism of ODR); Julio Cdsar Betancourt & Elina Zlatanska Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR): What Is It, and Is It the Way Forward? 79 INTL. J. ARB. MED. & DIsP. MGMT. 256,
263 (2013).
2 6 See, e.g., Betancourt & Zlatanska, supra note 25, at 263; Julia Hornle, Encouraging
Online Dispute Resolution in the EU and Beyond, 38 EUR. L. REV 208 (2013) (criticizing
ODR initiatives that "move away from due process ... and justify this with the argument
that cross-border low-value and high volume disputes cannot be solved other than through
very efficient, highly automated, and hence, cost-effective procedures.").
27 Ethan Katsh & Janet Rifkin, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: RESOLVING CONFLICTS
IN CYBERSPACE 93-94 (2001).
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and process is delivered. The appearance, arrangement, and functions built
into an ODR system structure what is (and what is not) possible and likely to
occur.28 In fact, "the fourth party" is a particular case of a larger socio-techno-
legal phenomenon in virtual environments, which Lessig famously termed
"code is law."29 It conveys the notion that the way that a software tool is
designed and programmed to operate is not neutral; it reflects-and
promotes-particular values which affect the way it services its users.30
B. Instrumental vs. Principal ODR Systems
Despite the neat appeal of a homogenous conceptualization of
technology's role in ODR, the tremendous developments that the field has
undergone render the singular fourth-party concept insufficient, both
descriptively and normatively."1 The various-substantially different-roles
that technology can play in the dispute resolution process call for more fine-
grained definitions. The fundamental distinction proposed here, refers to the
degree of autonomy the software possesses in providing dispute resolution
28 Id. at 33, 93.
29 Lawrence Lessig, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (analyzing
the way law is embedded in the software code of virtual environments and how this code
can be systematically used either to protect or erode our fundamental values).
30 In the context of ODR, see also David A. Larson, "Brother, Can You Spare a
Dime?" Technology Can Reduce Dispute Resolution Costs When Times Are Tough and
Improve Outcomes, 11 NEv. L. J. 523, 548-549 (2001) ("When parties are asked to choose
an option ... how are those options determined? If a party cannot make a decision and a
default option is available, upon what considerations was that default option based? Is the
program designed to guide parties to a settlement regardless of whether that is their desire
under these circumstances?"); Rafal Morek, The Regulatory Framework for Online
Dispute Resolution, 38 U. ToL.L. REv. 163, 188-189 (2006-2007) ("In ODR, inefficiency,
errors, or bias can be hidden under nicely crafted computer interfaces based on the way the
program was constructed."); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact: The Quest for
a New Paradigm for Accountability in Mediation, II HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 253, 274-276
(2006); Oma Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Lessons from Online Dispute Resolution
for Dispute System Design, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
(Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al, eds.) 39, 50, 52 (2012).
3 Famed suggested classifying ODR into three classes with some mention to the role
of technology, proposing that Class I ODR deals with disputes that arise online, Class II
deals with dispute that arise offline, and Class III deals with either kind of disputes without
human assistance. Unfortunately, Famed offers no concrete definition for each class, and
the examples given seem to overlap between classes. See Dusty Bates Famed, A New
Automated Class of Online Dispute Resolution: Changing the Meaning of Computer-
Mediated Communication, 2 FAULKNER L. REv 335, 337-341 (2011).
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services: instrumental ODR systems play a classic fourth party role,32
facilitating the interaction between the disputants and third-party in the
process whereas principal ODR systems play the role of both the fourth and
third parties.
Instrumental ODR systems are essentially a virtual space for convening
the dispute resolution process: a specialized communication platform that
enables conducting the process online. Typically, instrumental ODR systems
provide generic process orientation and help parties collect and deliver
information in a manner constructive to the dispute resolution process:
planning, interaction, and decisionmaking remain in control of the human
parties who use them. Instrumental ODR platforms require, therefore, a human
third-party to operate them and communicate with the disputants.34 More
advanced software tools can be used in the process, but they have no decisive
role or autonomy.
Principal ODR systems go beyond enabling communication and access to
information; they take a proactive role facilitating the resolution of the dispute.
Typically powered by artificial intelligence, principal ODR systems automate
classic third-party capacities such as identifying interests and goals, educating
parties about available options, refining preferences and defining strategies,
diagnosing applicable rules and applying them, classifying and routing cases
to relevant resolution paths, calculating tradeoffs and enabling maximization
of mutual gains, generating resolution options, and determining final
outcomes." As such, principal ODR processes can relieve disputants of many
of the dependencies on the limited and expensive supply of expert human third
parties. The ability of artificially intelligent systems to deliver professional
32 Katsh & Rifkin's "fourth party" does not conceive of technology as replacing the
human third-party, but rather as aiding in or enhancing his/her work (See supra note 27, at
94.).
" See also, Arno R. Lodder, The Third-party and Beyond. An Analysis ofthe Different
Parties, in particular the Fifth, Involved in Online Dispute Resolution, 15 INFO. &
COMMUNICATIONS TECH. L. 144, 151 (2006) (proposing that an automated ODR platform
that relies on blind-bidding can be described as the third-party.); Davide Carneiro et al.,
Online Dispute Resolution: An Artificial Intelligence Perspective, AIRTIF. INTELL. REV
(2012) (Published online January 3, 2012) available at:
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007 %2Fs10462-011-9305-z (drawing a conceptually
similar distinction between first and second generation ODR systems, the proposed
instrumental/principal conceptualization avoids any such implied temporal chronology).
3" With the exception of negotiation processes where the two parties communicate
directly.
3 For a review of third-party functions supported by Al technologies in current ODR
systems see the application of the instrumental/principal typology below, as well as Larson,
supra note 30, at 550; Carneiro et al., supra note 33.
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services and perform complex and nuanced interactive tasks is constantly
evolving, and can now be augmented by a human-like interactional
experience.36 These developments are bound to have an effect on principal
ODR, introducing new qualitative features into the practice of dispute
resolution.3 7
The instrumental/principal conceptualization is a useful framework for
studying the impact of technology on ODR processes." The clear distinction
is useful for testing the isolated effect of the role of technology, although in
reality, many ODR platforms present a tiered hybrid model: beginning with
instrumental capacities and transitioning to principal capacities, or vice versa.
In such instances, it is more useful to talk about instrumental and principal
processes.3 9
36 Technologies that were once a considered a gadgetty curiosity-such as the natural-
language processing abilities employed by IBM's jeopardy-player computer, Watson; or
the voice recognition capabilities of Apple's personal assistant software, Siri-are now
harnessed to deliver professional services, including legally-oriented services, see Susan
Beck, The Future of Law, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (August, 2014). For examples of
specific ODR applications, see generally Douglas Walton & David M. Godden,
Persuasion Dialogue in Online Dispute Resolution, 13 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 273
(2005) (proposing the modeling of persuasion dialogues in negotiation to allow them to be
implemented in a computerized fashion in an ODR system); Gian Piero Turchi, Valeria
Gherardin & Federico Bonazza, The Web Service on The Evaluation of The Mediation
Effectiveness for E-Commerce Disputes: A Strategic Tool for Developing and Promoting
ODR Services, Paper Presented at the I 1 International ODR Conference (2012)
(presenting a tool for analyzing discursive repertories in ODR communications); Larson,
supra note 30, at 550.
" For a review of Al ODR, see David A. Larson, Artificial Intelligence: Robots,
Avatars, and the Demise of the Human Mediator, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 105,
114-154 (2010); Cameiro et al. supra note 33. For discussion of the effect of such new
ODR technologies on dispute resolution methods and system design, see Sela, supra note
3.
3 Capturing the illusive boundary between "instrumental negotiation" and "principal
mediation" may be more art than science, and thus challenging for the
principal/instrumental framework (pinpointing the point at which an ODR process based
on structured information exchange provides sufficient facilitative capacities to cross the
threshold of "instrumental negotiation" into the realm of "principal mediation"). Such an
ODR system may warrant its own sui generis category. See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh,
supra note 30, at 55. Similarly, blind-bidding-based ODR systems can be classified as
either "instrumental negotiation" or "principal arbitration." The determining factor may be
the parties' willingness to submit themselves to the outcome the software yields. Thus, I
tend to agree with Rule's view that blind-bidding ODR systems are akin to arbitration.
(Colin Rule, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR BUSINESS: B2B, E-COMMERCE,
CONSUMER, EMPLOYMENT, INSURANCE, AND OTHER COMMERCIAL CONFLICTS 57 (2002)).
" Hybrid ODR platforms commonly commence with a principal phase including an
automated intake to define interests, identify applicable rules, discover issues of agreement
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Examples of instrumental ODR platforms include straightforward
platforms such as net-arb.com,40 SettleToday.com,4 1 the ODR platforms
operated by the Consumer Protection Agency4 2 and the Civil Resolution
Tribunal (CRT)4 3 in the Canadian district of British Columbia, and the Traffic
Penalty Tribunal." These platforms follow a common process design theme:
The parties and neutral(s) communicate and exchange evidence via a web-
interface that serves as a private online case-environment." Some instrumental
ODR platforms, such as Money Claim Online46 and ODR platforms for
property assessment appeals,47 rely heavily on structured information
collection in web-forms to streamline the process, but a human case officer or
judge manages the process and issues decisions.
Most principal ODR platforms in the market offer a hybrid process design,
commonly starting with a principal process, and if necessary, concluding with
a human-facilitated instrumental process, although the reverse sequencing can
also be found.48 Reliance on automation and Al in ODR can take many
different forms. Likely the most famous example of a principal ODR process
is the eBay Resolution Center.49 It is a questionnaire-based algorithmic expert
system that performs the role of a mediator: collecting factual information,
/disagreement, and propose resolutions (sometimes followed by constructed negotiation
(or "automated mediation") to attempt resolution. If resolution is not reached, parties may
continue to an instrumental phase, facilitated by a human mediator, arbitrator, judge or
jury. Conversely, a med-arb process design can begin with a mediation process facilitated
on an instrumental platform, and if resolution is not reached, move to a principal phase
using blind-bidding automated arbitration.
40 See INTERNET-ARBITRATION, http://www.net-arb.com/.
41 See SEATTLE TODAY, http://www.settletoday.com.
42 See CONSUMER PROTECTION BC, http://www.consumerprotectionbc.ca/odr.
43 See CIV[L RESOLUTION TRIBUNAL, https://www.civilresolutionbc.ca.
"See supra note 7.
45 The web interface may support different communication options, such as web-
forms, e-mail messages, online boards, chat-rooms, file uploads or online audio or video-
conferencing. Some platforms support additional features, such as collaborative text
editing, caucusing (private communications of one party with the neutral) and editable
resolution templates.
' See supra note 6.
47 Several similar systems are operated by: Ohio Board of Tax Appeals, available at:
http://bta.ohio.gov/; Property Appraisal by Alachua County, FL Property Appraiser
available at http://www.acpafl.org/ResCenter/index.html; Fulton County Board of
Assessors Appeal Process, available at: https://fultoncounty.modria.com/; Property
Assessment Appeals by the Assessor of Property, Davidson County, TN available at:
https://padctn.modria.com/
" See the discussion on med-arb using blind bidding, supra note 39.
49 RESOLUTION CTR., http://resolutioncenter.ebay.com/.
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identifying preferences, and suggesting resolution options. It is considered by
many "the paradigmatic example of an ODR system,"'o perhaps because it
presented the first obvious business-case for designing an automated principal
ODR system: Employing staff to resolve over sixty million annual buyer-seller
disputes was operationally and economically impossible, especially given the
low value of the disputes.51 To automate the process, eBay constructed a
decision-tree of "paths to resolution" based on patterns it detected in the ways
disputes emerge and get resolved. It helps disputing buyers and sellers to
diagnose the problem and it generates concrete resolution options that both
parties are likely to accept.52 Today, eBay Resolution Center automatically
resolves 90% of its case load without involvement of a human third-party;53
the rest proceed to an instrumental process managed by a neutral from eBay,
based on the information that was shared.
Another example of a principal ODR system is automated arbitration by
(double) blind-bidding. CyberSettle,54 SmartSettle One,5 and the Freelancer
soRabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 30, at 54
I Colin Rule, the former director of eBay's dispute resolution program indicated that
the disputes "[C]an be for as little as $5, such as a magazine, or as much as $50,000, such
as a car, but the average is probably around $100" and that "[due to] the overwhelming
volume of cases .. . even if I had built a staff of 1000 skilled online mediators, we would
not be able to get through the torrent of cases. . . . It was self-evident that the process
needed to be as automated as possible." (Colin Rule, Making Peace on eBay: Resolving
Disputes in the World's Largest Marketplace ACRESOLUTION MAGAZINE, Fall 2008, at 8,
9).
52 Essentially, eBay employed a "big-data" approach. Because all transaction related
activities are performed on eBay's own website (with its financial partner PayPal) the
company gained "[FJamiliarity with the spectrum of disputes [which] enabled [them] ...
to design dedicated systems tailored specifically to each dispute type." (Rule, supra note
51, at 10). Such modeling was feasible because the vast majority of eBay disputes are of a
narrowly-defined consumer-type (product is late/missing/broken /not as described, etc.)
and eBay has complete visibility into the lifecycle of disputes on its platform.
" See Schmitz & Rule, supra note 5, at 53. ("eBay's ODR was successful because the
automated resolution rate reached 90%. That meant that 90% of the 60 million disputes
were resolved in software only. . . ."). See further (Rule, supra note 51, at 10); Cooper,
supra note 5, at 35 (referring to a report by Colin Rule, the Director of Dispute Resolution
at eBay/Paypal. If the automated phases failed to yield a resolution, the dispute would
move to an evaluation phase, where eBay and payment system provider PayPal would
decide the case).
5 See CYBERSETILE, http://www.cybersettle.com. In 2013 the company launched
PayMed, and it is now focusing only on settlements in the medical bills industry.
5 See Smartsettle One +, SMARTSETrLE,
http://www.smartsettle.com/home/products/smartsettle-one/
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ODR system" perform this service for single-issue monetary disputes; Fair
Outcomes' Adjusted Winner process5 7 employs a similar mechanism for multi-
issue disputes. In blind-bidding processes, parties submit several settlement
proposals (typically three); the ODR system sequentially checks the proposals
against each other to detect a monetary range of possible agreement; if
matched proposals fall within this range, the algorithm yields a final award by
splitting the difference. On some platforms, all proposals are confidential; on
others, only the reservation/acceptance point is confidential.
Another notable principal ODR system, Smartsettle," aims to maximize
the utility product of mediation processes by overcoming problems of
information sharing and non-collaborative strategic behavior. Parties jointly
define the issues in controversy, confidentially indicate their preferences with
respect to each issue, and then exchange "package proposals" to define the
range of their agreement/disagreement. The software uses their initial stated
preferences and their reported level of satisfaction with each proposal to
automatically generate new "package proposals" that the parties are more
likely to mutually accept. The process is repeated until a win-win solution is
found.5 9
" Freelancer is an online market for clients and service providers. It offers its users
an ODR service which combines blind bidding with human-ran arbitration for more
complex cases. See Dispute Resolution ServicesFREELANCER,
http://www.freelancer.com/faq/topic.php?id=25.
5 7 See Fair Division, FAIROUTCOMES, INc, http://www.fairoutcomes.com/fd.html ("[A]
bidding process that guarantees each party at least 1/2 of what that party considers to be
the total value of all of the items or issues in question-and usually allows each party to
receive between 2/3 and 3/4 of that value-facilitating a win-win outcome."). The
company also offers a single issue blind bidding system: Fair Buy Sell See Fair Buy-Sell,
FAIROUTCOMES, INc, http://www.fairoutcomes.com/fb.html).
ss See SMARTSETTLE, http://www.smartsettle.com/. For a detailed description of
Smartsettle see Earnest M. Thiessen & Joseph P. McMahon Jr., Beyond Win-Win in
Cyberspace,15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 643 (2000).
" Smartsettle's process design is discernable from their promotional videos. See e.g.
Smartsettle Videos, SMAR75ET7LE, http://smartsettlefamily.com/the-process/ and
http://www.smartsettle.com/home/resources/videos/. Thiessen & McMahon think that
such a sophisticated mediation software would be "[Blest employed by a qualified [human]
neutral facilitator . ... supra note 58, at 645, while Ware & Cole seem to refer to it as an
improved mediator, that "[Tiakes the foundation of mediation and then adds to it both
analytical rigor and technological power," Stephen J. Ware & Sarah R. Cole, ADR in
Cyberspace, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 589, 592-3 (2000).
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Finally, Juripar60 is an example for an ODR system that includes a
combination of instrumental and principal mediation phases by design. Parties
first go through a case-intake stage designed as a branching questionnaire that
leads the parties through decision-tree logic of their case. Completing the
questionnaire serves a dual purpose. From the disputants' perspective, it
automates the beginning of the mediation process, educating them about the
process and what they can expect, helping them to confidentially collect and
organize information about the case and identify their interests in a structured
form, and instilling in them a collaborative attitude. From the perspective of
the human mediator who manages the subsequent instrumental mediation
phase, the principal phase streamlines all parties' process preparation and
assists the mediator in identifying contested issues.61
The instrumental/principal conceptualization of the role of technology in
ODR systems is an effective comparative framework for studying the
fundamental question at the heart of ODR: how does technology influence the
parties, process, and outcome? This article focuses on the first two themes,
arguing that disputants' evaluation of the fairness of an ODR process would
vary between instrumental and principal ODR, and that this difference is
sensitive to control over the outcome. In order to examine these questions
empirically, an experiment was conducted to test disputants' procedural
justice experiences in instrumental and principal ODR, in both consensual
(mediation) and binding (arbitration) procedural settings. Section H provides
a theoretical framework for discussing these questions and sets the
experimental hypotheses. The procedure and results of the experiment are
presented in Section III.
III. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN INSTRUMENTAL VS. PRINCIPAL ODR
The term procedural justice encapsulates the idea of fairness in the
processes by which decisions are made, as distinct from distributive justice,
which refers to fairness in the distribution of the outcome. It is an effective
comparative criterion for evaluating dispute resolution processes because it
transcends differences in method, context, goals, and in ODR-also
a In 2014, Juripax was acquired by Modria. However, Juripax's unique process design
can still be viewed in a promotional video available at: Juriprax Online Mediation
Technology, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?-2WE4R-4oCQY.
61 Juripax displays the responses of the two parties in a comparative table (visible only
to the mediator), facilitating (when possible-automatically) the identification of
uncontested and contested issues.
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technology;6 2 its effects have been consistently replicated across cultures and
settings, using multiple methodologies." Procedural justice is commonly
understood as comprising four dimensions: process control (control over the
opportunity to present evidence), decision control (control over the final
outcome), interactional justice (the decision maker's treatment of a person
with politeness, dignity and respect), and informational justice (the availability
of information and explanations about the process and its justification).' The
dimensions and the instruments for measuring them were developed and tested
in many applied studies," and are generally applicable to ODR.'
62 See also, Tom R. Tyler, The Quality of Dispute Resolution Procedures and
Outcomes: Measurement Problems and Possibilities, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 419, 422
(1989); Thomas D. Halket, Improving Arbitration through Technology: A Quest for Basic
Principles, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 54, 56, (2007) ("[A]ny meaningful basic principles will need
both to be relatively general in nature as well as to avoid the requirement, or even the
context, of the use of specific technologies.").
" See Robert MacCoun, Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of
Procedural Fairness I ANNU. REV. LAW Soc. SCI. 171, 171(2005) (noting that procedural
justice effects have "[Bjbeen replicated [using] a wide range of methodologies (including
panel surveys, psychometric work, and experimentation), cultures (throughout North
America, Europe, and Asia), and settings (including tort litigation, policing, taxpayer
compliance, support for public policies, and organizational citizenship)."). The weight of
the dimensions of procedural justice may vary by context and culture, See, e.g, Joel
Brockner et al., Culture and Procedural Justice: The Influence of Power Distance on
Reactions to Voice, 37 J. Exp. Soc. PSYCHOL. 300 (2001).
6 The first two dimensions were articulated in: John Thibaut & Laurens Walker,
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1975). The latter two dimensions were usefully outlined by Jason
A. Colquitt, On the Dimensionality of Organizational Justice: A Construct Validation ofa
Measure, 86 J. OF APPLIED PSYCH 386 (2001), building on earlier concepts in: Robert J.
Bies & Joseph S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria for Fairness, in
RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS (Robert J. Bies et al., eds.) 43 (1986);
Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Interactional Fairness Judgments: The Influence of
Casual Accounts 1 SOCIAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 199 (1987).
6 Notable contributions were made by: Gerald S. Leventhal & Jurgis Karuza Jr. &
William R. Fry, Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Preferences, in JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL INTERACTION: EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 167 (Gerald Mikula, ed. 1980), and the prolific work ofTyler
& Lind, including: Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in
Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 115 (1992); Tom R. Tyler
& Stephen L. Blader, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY,
AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000); and their many works cited supra notes 18 and
62, and infra in notes 179-182.
* See also, Klaming, supra note 20, at 149.
106
[Vol. 33:1 2018]
CAN COMPUTERS BE FAIR?
Like other dispute system design choices,67 conducting the process in an
online environment affects disputants' procedural justice experiences.68 The
medium of communication is directly related to informational justice and
interactional justice,6 9 which were shown to affect decision-control and
process-control judgments as a heuristic.70 Moreover, the specific forms of
information exchange and processing that an ODR system enables directly
affect disputants' ability to "tell their story" (exerting process-control and
decision-control) and their impression that they are being "heard."
The discussion in this section brings together literature on procedural
justice, communication, legal technology, psychology, and philosophy to
outline the impact that instrumental and principal processes are expected to
67 See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem
ofScale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 51 (2009) (discussing that dispute system design choices
should be mindful of contextual and institutional variables that may affect parties, and
particularly procedural power imbalances).
61 See Ayelet Sela, Streamlining Justice: How Online Courts Can Resolve the
Challenges of Pro Se Litigation, 26 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 331
(2017). See also, Leah Wing & Daniel Rainey, Online Dispute Resolution and the
Development of Theory, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 23, 26
(Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al, eds. 2012) ("[T]he dilemmas that ODR disputants and
practitioners face . . . are likely to emerge from the impact of technology on party
interaction and their conflict-related communications."); Llewellyn J. Gibbons, Robin M.
Kennedy & John M. Gibbs, Cyber-mediation: Computer-mediated Communications
Medium Massaging the Message 31 N.M. L. REV. 27,48 (2002) ("[T]he singular difference
between computer-mediated communication and face-to-face communication is that non-
verbal cues are reduced or eliminated in CMC, [but] there is no agreement on the effect
that this has on the communicative process."). Compare with Van Veenen, supra note 23,
6 (arguing that there may be advantages to conducting dispute resolution communications
online).
61 See also, Marta Poblet, et al., Mediation, ODR, and the Web 2.0: A Case for
Relational Justice AICOL WORKSHOPS: LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE 6237)
205, 205 (2009) (discussing the importance of Relational Justice in ODR: "[T]he justice
produced through dialogue and cooperative behavior, negotiation, and agreement among
natural or artificial actors.").
7 Tyler & Lind explain that interactional indicators serve as fairness heuristics for the
overall complex judgment of procedural justice, acting as "social signs and symbols that
people are comfortable interpreting ... a workable solution to some difficult problems."
(Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH
IN LAW 65, 80-81 (Joseph Sanders & Lee V. Hamilton, eds. 2001). Notably, heuristics are
especially powerful when people are self-represented and have little knowledge or
experience of the proceedings they take part in, a typical situation in many ODR processes.
See also, Kees Van den Bos, Fairness Heuristic Theory: Assessing The Information to
Which People Are Reacting Has A Pivotal Role in Understanding Organizational Justice,
in THEORETICAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 63 (Stephen
W. Gilliland, et al, eds. 2001).
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have on disputants' experiences in online mediation and arbitration. The
discussion thus sets the hypotheses for the subsequently reported experiment.
The hypotheses are premised on two ideas: First, holding constant all other
process and outcome variables, disputants' procedural justice judgments are
shaped by their assumptions, expectations, and attributions about interacting
with human and software third-parties. Second, these cognitive mechanisms
operate differently when the role of the third-party is to facilitate the
interaction (mediation) or to issue a binding decision (arbitration).
Since evaluations of dispute resolution processes, procedural justice and
communication media are sensitive to context and setting," the discussion
assumes the specific characteristics of the studied ODR setting: A med-arb
process, conducted on a structured text-based web-interface (the EZSettle
experimental ODR platform) for resolving a multi-issue e-commerce
dispute.72 As a preview, the following predictions emerge from the discussion:
When the third-party's role is to facilitate the interaction, a software mediator
would be preferred, whereas when it is to issue a binding outcome, a human
arbitrator would be preferred. Accordingly, principal ODR would result in
more positive procedural justice experiences in mediation; and instrumental
ODR would be perceived as more procedurallyjust in arbitration. Lastly, over
the course of a med-arb process, disputants are expected to prefer that the
mediation and arbitration would both be either instrumental or principal. The
literature supporting these predictions is described below; a summary of the
hypotheses is provided at the end of this section, in Table 1.
A. Online Mediation: Expectations about Constrained
Interaction
The key role of mediators is to facilitate a fruitful interaction between the
parties to help them resolve the dispute. When interacting over an ODR
71 See Ethan Katsh, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REv 953, 974
(1996) ("[C]ontext can influence the approach of the neutral, the choice of process, and the
behavior and attitudes of disputants .... Context implicitly feeds us information about. .
. how the injury or dispute is perceived by those involved .... [W]e react and adjust
accordingly as the parameters of the environment become clear to us."); Edith Barrett-
Howard & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice as a Criterion in Allocation Decisions, 50 J.
OF PERS.& Soc. PSYCH. 296 (1986) (arguing that in formal settings bias suppression,
decision quality, consistency and representation are more important whereas in cooperative
situations consistency, decision quality and ethicality matter most). Gramatikov makes a
similar point in the context of measuring the quality of ODR processes (infra note 119 at
7).
72 For a detailed description of EZSettle's interface and process design, as well as the
details of the dispute, see Section III.
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system, people's judgment of the quality of the interaction is shaped by what
they expect from such interaction, and the degree to which the interaction that
occurs meets their expectation. The "Adjusted Expectations" hypothesis is
premised on the notion that people expect richer communication when
interacting with other people than when interacting with software. Thus, in the
EZSettle ODR system, principal mediation would be preferred because its
constrained lean text-based interface is more compatible with people's
expectations about interacting with software than with their expectations about
interacting with other people.
1. ONLINE INTERACTION IN CONFLICT: NON-VERBAL
CUES, TRUST AND EXPECTATIONS
Mediators' role relies heavily on effective communication.73 They
facilitate the interaction to help the parties agree on an acceptable outcome, by
assisting them to: build trust and rapport, exchange information, improve their
understanding of the dispute, identify their interests, and collaborate
creatively. Interpretation of these communications depends not only on the
words used to deliver them, but also on the availability of non-verbal cues and
the communicators' expectations about each other.
According to the Principle ofAudience Design (PAD), "messages hould
be designed to accord with an addressee's ability to comprehend them."74 Non-
verbal contextual, emotional, and behavioral cues contribute to people's
ability to interpret what their interactional counterparts intended their words
to mean and to regulate social interaction. In dispute resolution contexts, the
absence of non-verbal cues can be particularly detrimental because disputants'
antagonistic interpersonal and strategic orientation often leads them to
misconstrue communicative intentions and "fill in" information that worsens
the dispute rather than promotes its resolution.75 Interaction on ODR systems
7 For a review of the role of communication in dispute resolution see Robert M.
Krauss & Ezequiel Morsella, Communication and Conflict, in THE HANDBOOK OF
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 144 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T.
Coleman, eds. 2006).
74 See id. at 150.
7 See Krauss & Morsella, supra note 73, at 146-148. See also McGinn & Croson,
supra note 21, at 334 (discussing the communication medium as a social context variable
that affects parties' perceptions and interactions); Laura Klaming, Jelle van Veenen &
Ronald Leenes, I Want the Opposite of What You Want: Reducing Fixed-pie Perceptions
in Online Negotiations, 2009 J. DIsP. RES. 139. See generally on communication as social
context variable in dispute resolution: Thompson, supra note 73; Robin L. Pinkley, Terri
L. Griffith & Gregory B. Northcraft "Fixed pie" a la Mode: Information Availability,
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is largely shaped by their design-the specific way in which the platform
delivers messages. EZSettle, like most ODR platforms, is text-based, and does
not convey non-verbal cues.76
Expectations-and attributions we make based on them-also play an
important role in shaping our perceived ability to convey messages and
accurately interpret and predict the messages and actions of others. Moreover,
expectations cause us to instrumentally adjust our behavior throughout the
process (for example, our level of risk-taking) to fit our "cognitive map" of
expectations about our interactional counterparts' values, norms, and
behavior.77 Interestingly, in the context of dispute resolution, expectations-
and the inferences we continuously make about the "character" and
"motivations" of the third-party-are tightly connected to procedural justice
78Reerhs
experiences. Research shows that the mere belief that one is interacting with
a computer or human is sufficient to change one's attitudes and behavior.79 At
Information Processing, and the Negotiation of Suboptimal Agreements, 62
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 101 (1995).
76 Sela, supra note 3.
" See Leigh Thompson, Margaret Neale, & Marwan Sinaceur, The Evolution of
Cognition and Biases in Negotiation Research: An Examination of Cognition, Social
Perception, Motivation, and Emotion, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE
7, 9 (Michele J. Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett, eds. 2004) ("[P]eople attempt o make sense
out of novel situations by using previously developed knowledge structures. . [which]
operate in a top-down fashion to direct information processing, including attention,
categorization, and retrieval."); Zoe I. Barsness & Anita D. Bhappu, At the Crossroads of
Culture and Technology: Social Influence and Information-Sharing Processes During
Negotiation, in THE HANDBOOK OF NEGOTIATION AND CULTURE 350, 351-353 (Michele J.
Gelfand & Jeanne M. Brett, eds. 2004) (discussing the operation of cognitive scripts and
schemas in communication). Due to "confirmation bias," we are likely to continue
interpreting messages we receive in consistency with our preconceptions about the
software or human third-party who delivers them. See Owen D. W. Hargie, Interpersonal
Communication: A Theoretical Framework, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMMUNICATION
SKILLS 29 (Owen D.W. Hargie, ed., 2 ' ed., 1997).
71 See, e.g., the studies reported in: Kees van den Bos, Ridl Vermunt & Henk A. M.
Wilke, The Consistency Rule and the Voice Effect: The Influence of Expectations on
Procedural Fairness Judgments and Performance, 26 EUR. J. OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 411
(1996); TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 62-63 (2002).
" See Jesse Fox et al., Avatars Versus Agents: A Meta-Analysis Quantifying the Effect
of Agency on Social Influence, 30 HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 401 (2015)
(comparing virtual representations controlled by artificially intelligent software-agents or
humans).
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least in part, such variations are the result of people's different expectations
about interacting with humans and computers."
Accordingly, the "Adjusted Expectations" hypothesis proposes that
disputants' varying expectations about interacting with human and software
third-parties will lead them to react differently to instrumental and principal
ODR.
2. INSTRUMENTAL MEDIATION: GREATER
EXPECTATIONS, LOWER SATISFACTION
Research in the field of computer mediated communication (CMC)
between human actors typically evaluates it against the standard of face-to-
face interaction." Accordingly, it suggests that people are likely to find the
kind of lean, structurally-constrained online textual communication available
on most e-commerce ODR platforms (as well as on EZSettle) less suitable for
nuanced tasks such as dispute resolution.82 According to Media Richness
Theory (MRT),83 a lean medium of communication is less suited for tasks such
s For example, in an early study that compared subjects' cooperation with perceived-
human and computer players (both played by computer) during 100 rounds of the
Prisoner's Dilemma game, participants cooperated more with the human player (55%) than
with the computer player (35%), and they found the computer player was more rigid, less
adaptable, less kind, more competitive, and less honest than the human player. The
researchers suggested that in managing their decisions in the game, people take into
account the expectations (referred to as representations in the study) through which they-
perceive the experience, which are formed by considering what the game is capable of,
what the partner is capable of, and what they themselves are capable of. J. C. Abric & J. P.
Kahan, The Effects of Representations and Behavior in Experimental Games, 2 EUR. J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 129 (1972).
i See Mary J. Culnan & M. Lynne Markus, Information Technologies, in HANDBOOK
OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 420 (Fredric
M. Jablin et al., eds.1987) (discussing the "cues filtered out" effect in online
communication and its implications on regulating social interaction, supplying valuable
information for forming impressions and perceptions (including about the truthfulness of
a communication), and understanding the social context and content of communications).
32 See also Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A Systems
Approach-Potential Problems, and A Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 175, 180-
81 (1998) ("[T]he ultimate effect of using a computer-mediated communication to deliver
'difficult' or 'uncomfortable' news or feelings can actually lead to more rather than less
conflict between the involved parties . . .due to the narrower and more constrained means
of communicating."); Gillinron, supra note 15.
8 See Richard L. Daft & Robert H. Lengel, Information Richness: A New Approach
to Managerial Behavior and Organizational Design, 6 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAVIOR 191 (1984) (proposing that the richness of media is defined by four parameters
that render it better suited for complex tasks: Language Variety refers to the ability to
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as dispute resolution, which involve ambiguity, high interdependence, and
socio-emotional content." Social Presence Theory (SPT), which focuses on
the manner people experience themselves and make sense of social
interactions, yields similar predictions. SPT is concerned with the way people
perceive information, make attributions about others, and deem certain
behaviors appropriate." Lean media constrain disputants' ability to create
social presence--project themselves, perceive others, and sense that they are
perceived by others as "real."" Consistent with these predictions, studies
comparing email and face-to-face negotiations suggest hat online negotiators
typically enter the process with low expectations about their ability to
negotiate with their counterpart (especially with respect to interpersonal trust),
resulting in diminished process cooperation, minimal information sharing,
reduced cooperation, and lower reported levels of trust."
convey natural language rather than just numeric information; Multiplicity of Cues refers
to the number of ways in which information could be communicated; Personalization
refers to the ability to personalize the message; and Rapid Feedback refers to the ability to
respond to the communicator in real (or near-real time).
" In equivocal situations, information can be interpreted in more than one way. Since
it is typically unclear what specific type of data it required to reduce equivocality, rich
media will likely be better suited to support the task at hand. See also Alan R. Dennis &
Joseph S. Valacich, Rethinking Media Richness: Towards a Theory of Media
Synchronicity, HICSS (1999).
" See Joseph B. Walther, Computer-Mediated Communication: Impersonal,
Interpersonal and Hyperpersonal Interaction, 23 COMM. RESEARCH 3 (1996); Guoqiang
Cui, Barbara Lockee & Cuiqing Meng, Building Modern Online Social Presence: A
Review of Social Presence Theory and Its Instructional Design Implications for Future
Trends, EDUC. INF. TECHNOL. 2 (published online: March 11, 2013, DOI: 10.1007/s10639-
012-9192-1); Jennifer C. Richardson & Karen Swan, Examining Social Presence in Online
Courses in Relation to Students'Perceived Learning and Satisfaction, 7 J. ASYNCHRONOUS
LEARNING NETWORKS 68 (2003); Chih-Hsiung Tu, On-Line Learning Migration: From
Social Learning Theory to Social Presence Theory in a CMC Environment, 23 J. NETWORK
& COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 27 (2000).
86 See the review in Patrick R. Lowenthal, The Evolution and Influence of Social
Presence Theory on Online Learning, in ONLINE EDUCATION AND ADULT LEARNING: NEW
FRONTIERS FOR TEACHING PRACTICES 124, 129-131 (Terry T. Kidd, ed. 2010). The terms
"social presence" was popularized by Short et al., in the context of "offline" interactions,
referring to it as "the degree of salience of the other person in the interaction and the
consequent salience of the interpersonal relationships." John Short, Ederyn Williams &
Bruce Christie, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 65 (1976).
" See Charles E. Naquin & Gaylen D. Paulson, Online Bargaining and Interpersonal
Trust, 88 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 113 (2003); Leigh L. Thompson & Janice Nadler, Negotiating
via Information Technology: Theory and Application, 58 J. Soc. STUD. 109 (2002). See
also the discussion in Noam Ebner, ODR and Interpersonal Trust, in ONLINE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE ( Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab et al., eds.) 203, 223
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To summarize, in instrumental ODR, disputants are expected to compare
the mediator's performance to the experiential bench-mark of human face-to-
face interaction. Thus, on a structured text based ODR system such as
EZSettle, disputants likely perceive themselves as less capable of
understanding, participating in, and influencing the process and outcome, and
the mediator as limited in their ability to cultivate a fruitful and meaningful
interaction. This sense of diminished ability to engage in the process is
expected to negatively affect disputants' procedural, interactional, and
informational justice experiences, as well as their personal experiences and
evaluations of the neutral.
3. PRINCIPAL MEDIATION. REDUCED EXPECTATIONS,
HIGHER SATISFACTION
Arguably, people's expectations about the richness of communication and
creating social presence are lower when they communicate with software
agents than with humans. On the one hand, in consistency with PAD,
disputants' adjustment of procedural expectations (and behavior) to a lower
evaluative bar is likely to result in their feeling less constrained by a structured
text-based interface in principal ODR. On the other hand, there are other
cardinal concerns regarding the ability of a software mediator to perform its
role that may affect disputants' procedural justice experiences. For example, a
software mediator may seem depersonalized, mechanical, or excessively
formal in a manner that negatively affects the quality of the interaction and
service provided. However, research shows that advanced computer agents-
even ones that are represented by simple text messages or low-fidelity cartoon-
like characters-can exhibit conversationally appropriate social, emotional,
and personality features." People were shown to react to a computer's
(2012) (concluding that "we expect to find our [online] negotiation opposites
untrustworthy, and indeed-we find them to be so.") and McGinn & Croson, supra note
21, at 34 (reviewing key empirical studies on the topic). Giordano et al. compared face-to-
face to online instant chat messaging negotiation, concluding that people find it harder to
detect deception in computer mediated negotiation. George Giordano et al., The Influences
of Deception and Computer-Mediation on Dyadic Negotiations, 12 J. OF COMPUTER-
MEDIATED COMM. 362 (2007). These statements should be qualified: email practices are
constantly changing, and as Ebner suggests, may no longer be appropriately discussed in
a monolithic fashion: the various software and hardware used for emailing impact the
nature of the experiences it fosters. See Noam Ebner, Negotiating via (the New) Email, in
NEGOTIATION EXCELLENCE: SUCCESSFUL DEAL MAKING (Michael Benoliel, ed., 2 nd edition
2014).
88 See James Blascovich et al., Immersive Virtual Environment Technology as a
Research Tool for Social Psychology, 13 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 103 (2002); Maia
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personality,8 9 ethnic cues,90 and gender cues,9 ' identify a computer as a
teammate,9 2 and attribute to it responsibility.9 3 People also exhibit politeness,94
intimacy,95 and reciprocal behavior96 towards computers, and respond to
flattery and praise by them.97 The Computers Are Social Actors (CASA)
paradigm suggests, therefore, that computers can "elicit a wide range of social
behaviors even though users know that the machines do not actually possess
feelings, 'selves,' genders, or human motivations."98 Based on CASA, we can
Garau, The Impact of Avatar Fidelity on Social Interaction in Virtual Environments,
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University College London (2003),
http://www.itu.dk/people/khhp/konceptudvikling/; Jan M. Allbeck & Norman I. Badler.
Embodied Autonomous Agents, in HANDBOOK OF VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 313 (Kay M.
Stanney, ed. 2002). See also the works cited infra in note 98.
"See Clifford Nass et al., Can Computer Personalities Be Human Personalities?, 43
INTL. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 223 (1995); Youngme Moon & Clifford Nass, How
"Real" Are Computer Personalities? Psychological Responses to Personality Types in
Human-Computer Interaction, 23 COMMUNICATION RESEARCH 651 (1996).
' See Jean A. Pratt et al., Looking at Human-Computer Interface Design: Effects of
Ethnicity in Computer Agents, 19 INTERACTING WITH COMPUTERS 512 (2007).
" See Clifford Nass, Youngme Moon & Nancy Green, Are Computers Gender-
Neutral? Gender Stereotypic Responses to Computers, 27 J. APPL. Soc. PSYCHOL. 864
(1997).
' See Clifford Nass, Brian. J. Fogg & Youngme Moon, Can Computers be
Teammates?, 45 INTL. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 669 (1996); Daniel Johnson & John
Gardner, The Media Equation and Team Formation: Further Evidence for Experience as
a Moderator, 65 INTL. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES 111 (2007).
9 See Youngme Moon & Clifford Nass, Are Computers Scapegoats? Attributions of
Responsibility in Human-Computer Interaction, 49 INTL. J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUDIES
79 (1998).
' See Clifford Nass, Etiquette Equality: Exhibitions and Expectations of Computer
Politeness, 47 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 35 (2004); Reeves & Nass, infra note 98,
at 19-36; Clifford Nass, Youngme Moon & Paul Carney, Are People Polite to Computers
Responses to Computer-Based Interviewing Systems, 29 J. APPL. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1093
(1999); Pamela Karr Wisniewski & Michael Prietula, CASA, WASA, and the Dimensions
of Us, 26 COMPUTER-HUMAN BEHAV. 1761 (2010).
9 Youngme Moon, Intimate Exchanges: Using Computers to Elicit Self-disclosure
from Consumers, 26 J. CONSUMER RES. 324 (2000).
' Brian J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, How Users Reciprocate to Computers: An
Experiment That Demonstrates Behavior Change, Proceedings of CHI Conference:
Extended Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems 331 (1997).
" Brian J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, Silicon Sycophants: The Effects of Computers That
Flatter, 46 INT'L J. HUMAN-COMPUTER STUD. 551 (1997).
98 CLIFFORD NASS, JONATHAN STEUER & ELLEN R. TAUBER, COMPUTERS ARE SOCIAL
ACTORS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS: CELEBRATING INTERDEPENDENCE 72, 72 (1994). See also BYRON REEVES &
CLIFFORD NASS, THE MEDIA EQUATION: How PEOPLE TREAT COMPUTERS, TELEVISION,
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predict that a principal ODR software mediator that projects minimal
anthropomorphic and interactional cues9 will sufficiently overcome these
interactional challenges.
To summarize, in online mediation on a lean ODR system such as
EZSettle, where the third-party's role revolves around facilitating the
interaction between the parties without controlling the decision, the Adjusted
Expectations Hypothesis predicts that disputants would report more positive
procedural experiences in principal mediation than in instrumental mediation.
B. Online Arbitration: Human Autonomy and Machine
Made Justice
In arbitration processes, the third-party's main function is to issue a
binding-decision that will settle the dispute for the parties." There are two
primary reasons for making different hypothetical predictions about online
arbitration and mediation. First, procedural justice studies repeatedly
demonstrate that fairness judgments are sensitive to variations in process-
control and decision-control. Second, theories of law and technology suggest
that people may be inherently less comfortable relinquishing their decision
autonomy to software than to other people. It is therefore hypothesized that
disputants will report more positive procedural justice experiences in
instrumental online arbitration.
Principal online arbitration raises challenging normative concerns about
the nature of law and justice and the acceptable boundaries of human
autonomy. On the one hand, a software arbitrator may seem less susceptible
to bias and other forms of human error because it is presumed to consistently
and objectively apply the decisionmaking rules it is programmed to follow.
Thus, as long as a principal arbitration system is transparent about the way it
operates, PAD, MRT and SPT suggest that it would evoke more positive
procedural justice attitudes than an instrumental system, because disputants
AND NEW MEDIA LIKE REAL PEOPLE AND PLACES (1996); Clifford Nass & Youngme Moon,
Machines and Mindlessness: Social Responses to Computers, 56 J. Soc. ISSUES 81, 82
(2000); CLIFFORD NASS & CORINA YEN, THE MAN WHO LIED TO HIS LAPTOP: How
COMPUTERS CAN TEACH Us ABOUT HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS (2010).
* EZSettle included multiple anthropomorphic and interactional cues, including chat-
icons and semi-synchronous, conversational natural-language communication. See infra
Section III.
'"See Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 318, 318 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2012)
("Arbitration is a process by which a private third-party neutral renders a binding
determination of an issue in dispute.").
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would feel less constrained in communicating with a software third-party on
EZSettle.
On the other hand, if one ascribes to a humanist concept of justice rather
than a technical one, then the ability of a software arbitrator to yield fair
resolutions is questioned altogether. Indeed, the idea of "machine made
justice" typically evokes inherent resistance, because it is at odds with the
perception that fairness and justice are distinctly human traits that cannot be
generated even by the most advanced artificially intelligent software."0 '
Although current natural language, speech recognition, and image processing
technologies bestow software agents with unprecedented human-like abilities,
software are still unable to reason and decide like humans. The complex and
dynamic nature of legal phenomena makes it difficult to specify ex ante a
sufficiently robust and accurate set of rules to make normatively reliable
binding automated decisions across contexts, especially in situations that have
not been encountered before.'02 Not only does it seem challenging to
comprehensively 'translate' norms and justice concepts into concrete
statements that software can process; as of date, a software arbitrator cannot
'0 See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 291-92 (John Wilkinson
trans., 1964) (Jacques Ellul famously argued that "it is impossible to transform the notion
of justice into technical elements . . . . If one pursues genuine justice (and not some
automatism or egalitarianism), one never knows where one will end."). See also Scott J.
Shackelford & Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical
Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in the World of ODR, 2014
Wis. L. REV. 615, 636 (2014) (pointing out the difficulty that Al-powered ODR systems
would have in making judicial decisionmaking because of their inability to consider the
"impact to the wider society"); Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, The Ethics Of
Artificial Intelligence, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 316, 321-
322 (William Ramsey & Keith Frankish, eds., 2014) (explaining that "it is fairly
consensual that present-day Al systems lack moral status" because they possess neither
sentience (capacity for phenomenal experiences such as feeling pain and suffering) nor
sapience (capacities associated with higher intelligence, such as self-awareness), but that
pending technological developments, Al could have moral status).
1" Statistical algorithms use non-cognitive computational techniques to detect
patterns in data in order to automate tasks or make predictions by employing heuristics or
proxies to produce approximate outcomes, but their accuracy and normative
appropriateness is debatable. See Harry Surden, Machine Learning and the Law, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 87, 87 (2014) ("Modem Al algorithms ... have been unable to replicate most
human intellectual abilities, falling far short in advanced cognitive processes-such as
analogical reasoning-that are basic to legal practice ... a domain full of abstraction and
uncertainty."); Bostrom & Yudowsky, supra note 101, 319-320 (discussing the challenges
of designing "a[n AI] system that will operate safely across thousands of contexts;
including contexts not specifically envisioned by either the designers or the users;
including contexts hat no human has yet encountered).
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use common sense, normative interpretation and creative analogy in the same
ways humans do.io3
Thus, the "reluctant subordination" hypothesis is driven by the idea that
the effect of adjusted communicative expectations on procedural justice
judgments (predicted by PAD, SPT and MRT) is superseded by the perceived
limitation of software arbitrators to render fair and adequate decisions. This
hypothesis is consistent with the replicable finding that "[t]he structural
provision of opportunities for voice has no impact on perceived fairness unless
the information given to the decision maker is believed to have been given
adequate consideration"1 0 4 and "particularistic attention."10' Because it is
intrinsically difficult to judge software's motives, sincerity, character, and
trustworthiness,o6 it is challenging to believe a principal arbitrator can
appropriately consider the merits and decide the outcome of a dispute. To
summarize, the perceived nuanced nature of justice-and associated
expectations for adequate and particularistic consideration-are at odds with
the idea of automation.
At the end of the day, disputants' attitudes towards principal arbitration
may depend on their philosophical stance about the boundaries of human
autonomy vis-a-vis technology. Theories of law and technology address this
question on a normative continuum, ranging from emphasis on the potential
of human autonomy and agency to contain the implications of technology, to
fear of structural technological dominance and unintended and uncontrollable
consequences of technological systems and logic."o7 Instrumentalists are likely
103 See also RICHARD SUSSKIND, TRANSFORMING THE LAW: ESSAYS ON TECHNOLOGY,
JUSTICE AND THE LEGAL MARKETPLACE 286-287 (2000) ("Computers have not yet been
programmed to exhibit moral, religious, social, sexual, and political preferences akin to
those actually held by human beings. Nor have they been programmed to display the
creativity, craftsmanship, individuality, innovation, inspiration, intuition, commonsense,
and general interest in our world that we, as human beings, expect not only of one another
as citizens, but also ofjudges acting in their official role."). But see JOSEPH WEIZENBAUM,
COMPUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON: FROM JUDGMENT TO CALCULATION 207 (1976)
(Artificial intelligence pioneer John McCarthy, who named the field, responded to the
question "What do judges know that we cannot tell a computer?" with the unequivocal
answer: "Nothing.").
i0 Tyler & Lind, supra note 70, at 76-77. See also Shapiro & Brett supra note 19;
Tom R. Tyler, Conditions Leading to Value-Expressive Effects in Judgments of Procedural
Justice: A Test ofFour Models, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 333 (1987).
105 See Tyler & Lind, supra note 70, at 84 ("People want o believe that third parties
care about their concerns, consider their arguments, and try to be fair to them-symbols of
particularistic attention.").
'06 See id at 76; TYLER & HUO, supra note 78, at 62-63.
"o 7See Arthur Cockfield & Jason Pridmore, A Synthetic Theory of Law and
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 475 (2007).
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to see principal online arbitration as a neutral tool at the service of its users;"os
substantivists are likely to express concern for its intended and unintended
political, social and cultural impacts, particularly with respect to human
autonomy.'0 9 Much of the literature in ODR echoes substantive concerns that
online technology transforms the nature of dispute resolution processes,
impacting stakeholders and institutions in non-neutral ways that embody non-
transparent preference for certain values over others.io There are also explicit
concerns in ODR literature about the inherent risk and fear associated with
letting machines make binding decisions that influence people's lives."' The
Reluctant Subordination Hypothesis predicts, therefore, that disputants will
report more positive procedural justice experiences in instrumental online
arbitration compared to principal arbitration.
C Online Med-Arb: Consistent Technology for
Meaningful Participation
In a typical med-arb process, if mediation does not result in an agreement
between the disputants, the information that was exchanged in mediation is
08 ANDREW FEENBERG, TRANSFORMING TECHNOLOGY: A CRITICAL THEORY
REVISITED 5-6 (2002) (arguing that the instrumental approach is widely entrenched in
social science academia, government, and business).
'n See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and
Technology, 8 MINN. J. L. SCL & TECH. 551, 551 (2007) ("[The] risks presented by new
technologies can take varying forms: ... concerns about individual autonomy and privacy,
or concerns relating to community or moral values. Such risks and perceived risks often
create new issues and disputes to which the legal system must respond."); CURTIS E. A.
KARNOW, FUTURE CODES: ESSAYS IN ADVANCED COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW
221 (1997) ("[N]ew technologies change our language, they introduce new guiding
metaphors, and they thereby ultimately change the way in which we think about our culture
and ourselves."); David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 71, 71 (2001) ("Technological change affects the law ... making existing legal
categories obsolete, even meaningless."); Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?,
109 DAEDALUS 121, 122-125 (1980) (discussing the idea that technology has (intended
and unintended) political consequences that determine social values).
11 See, e.g., Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 30, at 50, 52 ("[D]igital technology
is transforming the very nature of these processes ... in ways that are bound to ... impact
... stakeholders and the organization alike ... technology is by no means neutral and a
particular software design reflects a preference for certain values over others.").
". See, e.g., Lodder, supra note 33, at 146 ("[Tlhe Fourth Party ... touches upon a
topic that frightens people: technology replacing humans."); ARNO R. LODDER & JOHN
ZELEZNIKOW, ENHANCED DISPUTE RESOLUTION THROUGH THE USE OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY (2010) (arguing that IT can be appropriately used in dispute resolution to
advise humans, rather than make decisions).
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subsequently considered by an arbitrator who renders a binding decision. In
EZSettle, the mediator and arbitrator are not the same entity, and the process
may be either principal or instrumental during both its mediation and
arbitration phases, or alternate between principal and instrumental mediation
and arbitration. As suggested earlier, disputants adjust their behavior in the
process in accordance with their expectations about the human or software
third-party they interact with. Thus, in med-arb processes that alternate
between instrumental and principal ODR phases, disputants are likely to
experience a communicative and strategic dissonance, because the arbitrator's
decision is dependent on the input provided in the preceding mediation phase,
which was communicated with a different audience in mind.112
There is ample evidence that people adjust their behavior-and
specifically, the content and style of their messages-when they communicate
with human and software agents.113 Through the prism of PAD, a multiple
audience problem arises when a communication needs to be designed "to
simultaneously convey different messages to different listeners."ll4 Thus,
"' See also Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution,
in 27 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 263-264 (Mark P. Zanna,
ed., 1995) (discussing, among other psychological barriers to dispute resolution, "the
individual's motivated effort to seek and preserve cognitive consistency, and conversely
to avoid and reduce dissonance vis-A-vis his or her actions, values, feelings, or beliefs")
(emphasis added).
"' See, e.g., Eyal Aharoni & Alan J. Fridlund, Social Reactions Toward People vs.
Computers: How Mere Labels Shape Interactions, 23 COMP. HUM. BEHAv. 2175 (2007)
(the mere label identifying an online interviewer as human or computer was found
sufficient to affect subjects' responses to an interviewer. Subjects engaged in heightened
impression management strategies (deferral to, or attempts to engage or appease) with the
perceived-human interviewer); NICOLE SHECHTMAN & LEONARD M. HOROWITZ, MEDIA
INEQUALITY IN CONVERSATION: How PEOPLE BEHAVE DIFFERENTLY WHEN INTERACTING
WITH COMPUTERS AND PEOPLE, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF CHI 2003: HUMAN FACTORS IN
COMPUTING SYSTEMS 281 (2003) (analyzing subjects' structured text-based conversations
with a computer that gave scripted responses revealed that when participants believed they
were conversing with a person (rather than a computer) they showed more behaviors
associated with establishing the interpersonal nature of the relationship); Carolyn Penstein
Ros6 & Cristen Torrey, Interactivity and Expectation: Eliciting Learning Oriented
Behavior with Tutorial Dialogue Systems, in HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION,
INTERACT 2005 323 (Maria F. Costabile & Fabio Patern6, eds., 2005) (exploring how
students perceptions of tutor qualities affect their different responses to human and
computer tutors); Timothy Robert Merritt, A Failure of Imagination: How and Why People
Respond Differently to Human and Computer Team-Mates (2012) (Ph.D. thesis, (National
University of Singapore) (outlining a series of experiments showing that a team-mate's
identity as human or software results in different emotional, evaluative, and behavioral
responses).
114 Krauss & Morsella, supra note 73, at 152.
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messages designed for a software mediator may be perceived by disputants as
inadequate, or sub-optimal, for a human arbitrator, and vice versa. Strategic
adjustment of messages when exchanging information, making offers or
brainstorming solutions during mediation may come, therefore, at the price of
either missing the full settlement potential in mediation or negatively affecting
subsequent arbitration decisions. Therefore, the Consistent Technology
Hypothesis predicts that disputants will report more positive procedural
experiences in med-arb processes in which both processes are either
instrumental or principal compared to processes that combine the two
technologies.
Table 1 summarizes the predictions about the effects of instrumental and
principal online mediation and arbitration processes on disputants' procedural
justice experiences. An experiment testing the hypothesis is descried in section
III. The results provide empirical support for some of the predictions. Section
IV discusses the results, along with their implications.
Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis Prediction
In non-binding mediation, disputants will report
Adpeuttd s more positive procedural experiences in principal
Expectations ODR
Reluctant In binding arbitration, disputants will report more
Subordination positive procedural experiences in instrumental
ODR
In med-arb processes, disputants will report more
Consistent positive procedural experiences when both
Technology processes use the same type of technology, either
instrumental or principal ODR.
IV. EXPERIMENT: DISPUTANTS' EXPERIENCES IN ODR
A. Experiment Design
An experiment was designed to examine whether disputants' experiences
of procedural justice in ODR vary as a result of two characteristics of the ODR
process: (a) the role of technology (instrumental/principal); and (b) the
allocation of decision-control (disputants/third-party). In other words, the
experiment tests whether the perception that an ODR process is managed by a
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software or human third-party leads to differences in disputants' procedural
justice experiences; and whether these experiences are sensitive to the
neutral's control over the outcome (mediation or arbitration.) Importantly, the
experiment does not compare the objective abilities of human and software
third-parties; rather, holding constant the nature of the service provided, it
captures how disputants' subjective procedural experiences differ when they
perceive the third-party as either autonomous software or a person interacting
with them via the online interface.
An experiment is an effective methodology for studying these questions
because it allows manipulating ODR processes to measure the specific effects
of the independent variables while holding constant potential confounding
factors. As a comparison, field studies would have faced not only accessibility
challenges, but also material differences in parties, case details, outcome,
neutral performance, context and settings, that would have confounded the
findings."' Concerns regarding external validity and realism 16 are mitigated
in a twofold manner. First, experimentally-produced procedural justice effects
have generally been replicated using other methodologies in field settings."'
Second, in ODR there is close verisimilitude between the online experimental
environment and real ODR environments, in terms of both interface design
and setting (participation through a personal computer). Indeed, experiments
are a standard methodology in procedural justice research"' and increasingly
in ODR studies."9
"' See also James A. Wall & Timothy C. Dunne, State ofthe Art-Mediation Research:
A Current Review 28 NEG. J. 217, 229, 239-240 (2012) ("[I]nvestigating ongoing
mediations is difficult, time consuming, and expensive-understandably, few disputants
and mediators are even willing to allow researchers to 'sit in' on their mediations . . .
researchers have relied upon surveys . . . [and] have made assumptions about causation . .
. report[ing] mediator behaviors as the independent, causal factors .... This theory building
can be complemented with laboratory studies of mediation.").
11 6 See, e.g., Robert M. Hayden & Jill K. Anderson, On the Evaluation ofProcedural
Systems in Laboratory Experiments: A Critique of Thibaut and Walker, 3 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 21 (1979).
117 See MacCoun, supra note 63, at 171.
11 Id. at 173.
119 See, e.g., Brooke Abrahams, Emilia Bellucci & John Zeleznikow, Incorporating
Fairness into Development of an Integrated Multi-agent Online Dispute Resolution
Environment, 21 GROUP DECISION & NEGOT. 3, 25-26 (2012) ("The key advantage of . . .
experimental studies generally, is the reduced ambiguity in specifying the relationship
between key variables. Also, it is possible to closely study the details of a process, such as
conciliation, which would be generally impossible in a real life situation. Finally, it allows
... impos[ing] new strategies in the situation that is safe but very difficult to do in the real
situation."); Martin Gramatikov, Methodological Challenges in Measuring Cost and
Quality ofAccess to Justice 1, 7 (TISCO Working Paper Series on Civil Law and Conflict
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To date, only a handful of empirical studies attempted capturing
disputants' experiences in ODR , focusing on issues such as gender,120
hierarchical dynamics,121 usability and outcome satisfaction,122 availability of
information,123 and saving face.124 An empirical approach similar to that of the
reported experiment had been used previously to test procedural justice
experiences in online video-based and text-based judicial processes.1 25 The
current experiment provides new insights concerning the procedural justice
effects of automated (software-powered) and human-powered ODR.
Resolution System, 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid= 1099392.
120 See Martin A. Gramatikov & Laura Klaming, Getting Divorced Online: Procedural
and Outcome Justice in Online Divorce Mediation, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 97 (2012)
(discussing female and male divorcees in ODR do not exhibit great differences in their
perceptions of the quality of the online procedure and the quality of the outcome, with both
parties assigning relatively high scores. Men tend to report higher monetary and time costs
of the procedure, whereas women are more concerned with negative emotions and damage
to important relationships).
121 Katalien Bollen & Martin Euwema, E-Supported Mediation: What Do We Learn
From The Field? Paper presented at he National Mediation Conference: Emerging
Dynamics in Mediation-New Thinking, New Practices, New Relationships (Sept. 10-13,
2012) (discussing two studies, one an online divorce mediation process, and another
comparing F2F mediation with a hybrid process combining online intake with F2F
mediation in hierarchical labor settings. In both instances parties were satisfied with the
online process; the hybrid process had an equalizing effect on parties' fairness and
satisfaction perceptions).
122 Marc Mason & Avrom Sherr, Evaluation of the Small Claims Online Dispute
Resolution Pilot (Sept. 1, 2008),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1407631 (evaluating a 25-cases pilot
of a court-connected online mediation process, focusing on disputants' reports of usability,
cost and satisfaction with outcome).
123 See Klaming et al., supra note 75 (discussing the results of two experiments
designed to test the distributive effect of providing negotiators with information about their
opponent's preferences and incentives independent of the resources that have to be
divided).
124 Jeanne M. Brett et al., Sticks and Stones: Language, Face, and Online Dispute
Resolution, 50 ACAD. MGMT J. 85, 85 (2007) (reporting the finding of an analysis of text
data from 386 disputes between eBay buyers and sellers which examined whether aspects
of "saving face" as seen in language and emotion accounted for settlement likelihood. The
analyzed texts were of interaction before mediators were assigned to the case and began
working with the parties).
125 Sela, supra note 68.
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1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
The experiment follows a 2x2 factorial design, as summarized in Table 2.
The first independent variable, perceived technology was operationalized into
two levels: Principal (Automated) ODR-the process was perceived to be
managed by an autonomous artificially intelligent software; and Instrumental
(Human-Powered) ODR-the process was perceived to be managed by a
person using the system to interact with the parties. The second independent
variable, decision-control was also operationalized into two levels:
Arbitration-the third-party issues a binding enforceable decision that settles
the dispute;126 and Mediation-the third-party facilitates communication and
makes suggestions to help the parties reach their own joint decision.'2 7
Table 2: Summary of Factorial Design
Instrumental Principal Arbitration
Perceived Arbitpararitrtioitr tion
Instrumental Human Mediator Human Mediator
Mediation Human Arbitrator Software Arbitrator
Principal Software Mediator Software Mediator
Mediation Human Arbitrator Software Arbitrator
To operationalize the independent variables EZSettle, an experimental
ODR platform, was constructed to credibly support instrumental and principal
mediation and arbitration processes. EZSettle holds constant across treatments
all other process features, including procedural design, third-party input,
counterparty input and outcome. To achieve this goal and maintain external
validity'28 EZSettle followed a med-arb process,129 where mediation and
126 See Cole & Blankley, supra note 100.
127 Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mediation, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
304, 304 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone, eds., 2012) ("Mediation is commonly
defined as a process in which a third party neutral, the mediator, assists disputing parties
in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution . . . without forcing a decision on either
party.").
128 Id. (see the description of principal ODR processes, pointing out that they are
typically offered in a two-tiered hybrid process which includes both principal and
automated phases).
129 Med-Arb is a hybrid process pursuant to which, by agreement, the parties engage
in mediation with the intention of submitting all unresolved issues to final and binding
arbitration.
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arbitration were conducted sequentially, as either instrumental or principal
ODR. The experimental manipulation, including the ODR system design and
hypothetical dispute are described in detail further in the article.
2. DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The experiment captured disputants' ex post perceptions of procedural
justice, the neutral, the outcome, and themselves. Due to the context-
sensitivity of the four dimensions of procedural justice, there is no universal
instrument to measure them; rather, "ad-hoc measures are given deference
because they allow questions to be tailored to the varied situations in which
justice has been examined."l3 0 Accordingly, drawing on instruments suggested
in procedural justice studies in law and psychology,"' negotiation,132 and
organizational behavior,3 3 a post-experimental questionnaire was developed
"o Neil M. A. Hauenstein, Tim McGonigle & Sharon W. Flinder, A Meta-Analysis of
the Relationship Between Procedural Justice and Distributive Justice: Implications for
Justice Research, 13 EMP. RESP.. & RTS. J. 39, 42 (2001). See also Jerald Greenberg,
Organizational Justice: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT. 399 (1990); Tyler,
supra note 18..
131 Particularly the work of Tyler & Lind and their collaborators: E. Allan Lind & Tom
R. Tyler, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988). See, e.g., Tyler supra
note 18; Lind et al. supra note 18; Tyler supra note 62; Tyler & Lind supra note 65, Tyler
& Blader supra note 65; Lind infra note 177; Tyler infra note 177; Tyler infra note 179;
Tyler & Huo, supra note 78, at 55. See also MARTIN GRAMATIKOV, MAURITS
BARENDRECHT, MALINI LAXMINARAYAN, JIN Ho VERONSCHOT, LAURA KLAMING, CORRY
VAN ZEELAND, A HANDBOOK FOR MEASURING THE COSTS AND QUALITY OF ACCESS TO
JUSTICE (2010); Martin Gramatikov, Malini Laxminarayan & Maurits Barendrecht,
Assessment of the Validity and Reliability of a Methodology for Measuring the Costs and
Quality ofAccess to Justice, TISCO WORKING PAPER SERIES ON CIVIL LAW AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION SYSTEMS No. 003/2010 (Feb. 2010),
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1559782; Gramatikov & Klaming,
supra note 64, at 33-34.
132 Jared R. Curhan, Hillary A. Elfenbein & Heng Xu, What Do People Value When
They Negotiate? Mapping the Domain of Subjective Value in Negotiation, 91 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 493 (2006); Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff& Tom R. Tyler,
Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fairness, Outcome Acceptance, and
Integrative Potential, 33 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 473 (2008).
133 See Colquitt, supra note 64, at 389; Gerald S. Leventhal, Jurgis Karuza Jr. &
William R. Fry, Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation Preferences, in JUSTICE AND
SOCIAL INTERACTION: EXPERIMENTAL AND THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 167 (Gerald Mikula ed., 1980) (proposing six rules for
evaluating procedures: consistency of treatment, bias suppression, accuracy of information
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to capture disputants' self-reported procedural experience. The instrument
includes the following items: (a) Procedural Justice: process fairness,
voice/participation, process control, decision control, bias suppression, and
accuracy; (b) Interactional Justice: the third-party's attentiveness,
respectfulness, and trustworthiness; (c) Informational Justice: explanation of
process and clarity. The questionnaire included standardized questions with a
7-points response scale, using multiple indicators per each dimension (see
Table 3). Two additional categories of procedural evaluations were captured:
the neutral's perceived performance in terms of fairness and effectiveness; and
disputants' emotional experiences (affect),134 satisfaction,135 and sense of
empowerment (self-efficacy) in completing the process (see Table 4). After
responses were obtained, indicators were aggregated into indices (composite
measures) based on theory and factor analysis (see Table 8 in the Appendix).
collection, decision correctability, representation of affected parties, and ethicality
accordance with general standards of fairness and morality).
134 See Karen A. Hegtvedt & Caitlin Killian, Fairness and Emotions: Reactions to the
Process and Outcomes of Negotiations, 78 Soc. FORCES 269 (1999) (on the relationship
between perceptions of procedural fairness and emotions, parties who regarded the process
as fair were more likely to experience positive emotion (feel pleased about how it went)
and less likely to express negative feelings such as agitation, anger, and resentment after
the negotiation).
135 Kees van den Bos et al., Evaluating Outcomes by Means of the Fair Process Effect:
Evidence for Different Processes in Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments, 74 J. OF
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1493, 1493 (1998) (research demonstrates that "fairness
judgments do not always show the same effects as do satisfaction judgments, indicating
differences in the way people form judgments on these two dimensions").
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Table 3: Procedural Justice Measurement Instrument
Concept Dimension Indicato
Procedural Process Agree/Disagree: Process was objective
Justice Fairness
To what degree: Process was neutral
To what degree: Process was fair
Rules applied to parties: Same-Different
Voice/ Agree/Disagree: Able to express views
Participation Agree/Disagree: Parties could present their side
Process Agree/Disagree: My views were considered in
Control the process
To what degree: I controlled the process
Decision Agree/Disagree: My needs were considered in
Control the outcome
My influence over the outcome: None--A lot
Bias Agree/Disagree: Treatment was influenced by
Suppression my race, sex, age, nationality or other
characteristics
Accuracy Information collected was: Accurate-Inaccurate
Iteractional Neutral Neutral was: Attentive--Not attentive
Justice Attentiveness Agree/Disagree: Mediator listened when I
expressed my views
Neutral Neutral was: Respectful-Disrespectful
Respecfulness Agree/Disagree: Neutral treated me with respect
Neutral Trust- Agree/Disagree: Neutral was trustworthy
worthiness
Neutral was: Untrustworthy Trustworthy
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Table 4: Additional Procedural Measures
Concept Dimension Indicator
Neutral Neutral Fairness Neutral was: Fair-Unfair
Performance
Neutral was: Neutral--Not Neutral
Neutral Neutral was: Effective-Ineffective
Effectiveness Neutral was: Competent-Incompetent
Neutral was: Helpful-Unhelpful
Disputant Affect (Negative Agree/Disagree: Process upset me
Personal Emotions) Agree/Disagree: Process was stressful
Experience
I felt in the process: Hopeless--Hopeful
Empowerment Process effect on self-image Positive-
(Self-Efficacy) Negative
Process effect on competency resolving
disputes: Positive-Negative
Certainty During process I experienced:
certainty-uncertainty
Satisfaction Process : Satisfied-Unsatisfied
Process overall impression: Positive-
Negative
3. THE DISPUTE
Participants received a "Fact Sheet," stating that they were randomly
assigned to play the role of a student who bought a used laptop computer on
PC4U.com, an e-commerce website for computers.'36 It provided information
about the sale listing, the delivery, and the condition of the delivered computer.
It further described the buyer's perspective about problems with the
transaction, and indicated that pursuant to the buyer's complaint to PC4U.com,
the buyer and seller were referred to EZSettle to resolve the dispute. The Fact
Sheet contained additional information about the remedies the buyer is
seeking, which allowed in conjunction with the information available to them
136 Participants were led to believe that subjects could be assigned to play the role of
either the buyer or the seller in the dispute. In effect all subjects were assigned to play the
same buyer role.
127
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
for a multi-issue mediation process, and a variety of plausible outcomes. To
increase the probability that arbitration will ensue, the Fact Sheet set high
expectations about the "zone of possible agreement," rendering participants
unlikely to accept the offers that the seller was scripted to make.
4. THE MED-ARB PROCESS
EZSettle was specifically designed as a mock ODR system for this
experiment: generating a convincing manipulation while maintaining a
standardized performance across treatments. To that end, EZSettle had to
appear credible both as a principal autonomous mediation and arbitration
software and as an instrumental platform facilitating communications between
participants and human third-parties. Designing EZSettle as a med-arb process
ensured that participants went through a standardized process and obtained a
standardized outcome.'37
EZSettle combined features of current ODR systems to support structured
multi-issue information exchange, interest-identification, blind-biding and
communication. The mediation phase was designed as an asynchronous
shuttle mediation (the mediator interacts separately with the two parties, and
delivers messages between them).138 Parties were presented with the list of
issues to be resolved and ranked the subjective importance of each issue to
them. The mediator then led them through up to three rounds of offers and
counter-offers, during which they were able to use designated text-boxes to
send messages to the seller and mediator, as well as buttons to accept or reject
offers.3 9 Between offer rounds, the mediator made two suggestions aimed at
advancing a mutually acceptable resolution by reducing "fixed-pie"
perceptions and encouraging integrative solutions. Participants were asked to
confidentially indicate on a 100-point scale their willingness to consider each
of the mediator's suggestions and to adjust their subsequent offers. If
1' The existence and nature of an outcome can significantly affect procedural
experiences. Designing the experiment as a med-arb process avoids such variations and
enables measuring only the effect of the perceived technology and decision control.
Separating the two processes would have inevitably resulted in different (or absent)
mediation outcomes and differences between mediation and arbitration outcomes. A med-
arb process also allows holding constant he nature of participation in both mediation and
arbitration processes. The discussion of limitations at the end of the article refers to some
of the biases introduced by this design.
138 A common mediation practice, this feature enabled a more credible manipulation
of the interaction.
139 Messages were exchanged in an asynchronous form along with the submitted offers
to enable standardization of the messages according to the experimental script.
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participants rejected the seller's third counteroffer, they were directed to
arbitration. The experiment design was successful at ensuring that the vast
majority of cases would advance to arbitration. EZSettle Arbitration began
with a display of the information that the arbitrator will review prior to
rendering the final decision. It included all the information shared in
mediation. Participants were asked to confirm that the information is accurate
and then wait for the arbitrator's final resolution. To enhance credibility, the
decision was rendered after a few minutes. To mitigate distributive justice
effects and enable identification of differences in disputants' process
experiences, the outcome was held constant,14 0 representing a reasonable,
albeit not strikingly favorable, outcome in terms of the expectations et in the
Fact Sheet. After reviewing the arbitration award, participants were prompted
to complete the post-experimental questionnaire.
5. MEDIA TOR, ARBITRATOR AND SELLER
In order to hold constant the nature and quality of the contribution and
offers of the third-party across participants and treatments, the principal and
instrumental neutrals, as well as the seller were standardized in all the
experimental groups.14 ' During the three rounds of mediation, the mediator
140 Tyler & Huo, supra note 78, at 54 ("[P]rocedural justice is distinct from, but not
independent of, outcome concerns"). See also id at 39 (suggesting that methodologically,
the negative experience associated with unfavorable results will have greater impact on
subjects than the positive experience of an overwhelmingly favorable outcome); id at 14
(normatively, "[an important issue for justice research has been establishing the degree to
which people accept decisions because of how they are made rather than because of their
content") (internal citation omitted). For a meta-analysis of the relationship between
distributive and procedural justice, see Hauenstein et. al., supra note 130, at 39.
141 Software counterparts have been used in dispute resolution research to
operationalize both software and human actors since the 1970s, and their use has become
increasingly prevalent in recent years. See, e.g., James D. Orcutt & Ronald E. Anderson,
Social Interaction, Dehumanization and the "Computerized Other", 61 Soc. & Soc. RES.
380 (1977) (describing an experiment in social awareness and procedural consequences in
which participants were told they would be interacting with either another person or with
a computer, both of which were enacted by the same programmed computer). See also
Celso M. de Melo & Peter J. Carnevale, Agent or Avatar? Using Virtual Confederates in
Conflict Management Research, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy
of Management (2013) (methodologically, this research practice has proved very useful in
studying differences between interactions with humans and software). See also Nass &
Moon, supra note 98, at 99 (describing multiple experiments in which "half of the
participants are led to believe they are working with a computer, whereas the other half are
led to believe that they are using a computer to communicate with a person in another room
... all participants experience identical interactions . . . we are thus able to manipulate
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sent messages to the buyer, whose content and frequency of delivery were
standardized across treatments. While participants waited for the mediator and
seller to react to their proposals and messages, a dynamic hover pop-up
window appeared, requesting participants to wait "while the mediator
communicates the offer to the seller." The page reloaded after ninety seconds
with the Seller's response and offer, for continued interaction with the
mediator. Manipulation of instrumental and principal processes was
established and maintained continuously throughout the process using
different information (short descriptions of the person or software tool); visual
representations (avatars on the messaging interface) and minor language
variations in the messages that were sent. The Seller's messages and offers in
the process were similarly held constant.142 Post-experimental manipulation
checks confirmed that the manipulation was successful: participants believed
that they were interacting with another student-participant and with either a
human third-party (in instrumental treatments) or software third-party (in
principal treatments).14 3
B. Experimental Procedure
The study was conducted as an online experiment, completed by a group
of 86 students (68 undergraduate and 18 graduate) from Stanford University
who participated in the study to receive credit for class research
requirements.'" Subjects' mean age was 21.2 years, the median was 21. Due
participants' perceptions of their interaction partners while controlling all other elements
of the experimental situation.").
142 Nancy A. Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness in Negotiation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 754,
764 (2004) (controlling for the fact that "mediation participants' procedural fairness
perceptions are based very much upon the dynamics of their interaction with each other.").
"' The credibility of EZSettle's manipulation of instrumental and principal mediation
and arbitration was honed over three rounds of pre-tests prior to running the experiment.
" The sample size is comparable with other similar experiments. See, e.g., Klaming
et al., supra note 75, at 144-145 (reporting a similar division of 84 student-participants in
an online negotiation experiment into 6 treatments groups of 14 subjects each). A relatively
small experimental sample size is useful in producing a conservative test of a hypothesis.
See Matt Wilkerson & Mary R. Olson, Misconceptions About Sample Size, Statistical
Significance, and Treatment Effect, 131 J. PSYCHOL. 627 (1997) (explaining that a small
sample requires a greater treatment effect than a large sample to obtain an equal level of
statistical significance); see also David Bakan, The Test of Significance in Psychological
Research, 66 PSYCHOL. BULL. 423, 429 (1966) ("[T]he rejection of the null hypothesis
when the number of cases is small speaks for a more dramatic effect in the population; and
if the p value is the same, the probability of committing a Type I error remains the same.
Thus one can be more confident with a small [sample size] than a large [one]."). Twenty
one (21) students who signed up for the experiment could not complete it due to technical
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to class composition, the subject population included 59 females and 27
males.145 The recruitment process was designed to enhance the experimental
manipulation and preserve external and internal validity. 14 6 Participants
received instructions and familiarized themselves with their role in the dispute
as described in the "Fact Sheet," and were then directed to a separate
commercial-looking website: EZSettle, to begin the dispute resolution process.
Upon logging in to EZSettle, participants were randomly assigned to one of
six treatment groups. In groups 1-4, the process was described to participants,
according to their specific treatment, as beginning with either human or
software mediator and continuing, if necessary, with either human or software
arbitrator.14 7 After completing the med-arb process on EZSettle, participants
were directed to a questionnaire about the two processes. Participants in
treatment groups 5-6 were randomly assigned to either principal mediation or
instrumental mediation. They were singled out to ensure that their mediation
experiences are captured independent of their experiences in arbitration,'4 8 and
thus responded to a questionnaire about mediation prior to arbitration.
C Results and Analysis
1. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
The results of the experiment ell an interesting story, mostly confirming
the hypotheses. Given a particular dispute resolution process design, its
perceived nature as principal or instrumental affects disputants' procedural
problems running the experimental website on their personal computer. This technical
attrition was not linked to any specific treatment group.
145 There were no significant differences in results based on gender, age or career.
14 Members of the subject pool received an email inviting them to participate in a
study
pilot-testing EZSettle, a new web-service for resolving disputes. Participants were told they
would be paired with another participant, and they would be randomly assigned to role-
play either a buyer or seller in an e-commerce dispute that they would attempt to resolve.
Participants were asked to check-in to the experiment by emailing the experimenter at the
specific time designated to each pair, and the experimenter would reply with a link to the
study website. To encourage authentic behavior and preserve external validity, participants
completed the experiment in a typical setting for an ODR process-using their personal
computers in a location of their choice.
147 As explained in Section III, the design was successful as participants were almost
invariably made to continue to arbitration.
148 Subjects assigned to treatment groups 5-6 were aware that a med-arb process would
ensue, but they were not informed of the identity of the arbitrator until the beginning of the
arbitration process.
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justice experiences. On EZSettle's lean structured text-based interface,
subjects felt higher levels of procedural justice in mediation with a perceived
software mediator. In arbitration, the inverse trend was observed: subjects had
more favorable procedural justice experiences when they believed a hunan
arbitrator determined the case.149 Interestingly, in both mediation and
arbitration the largest effect was observed with respect to the most
fundamental component of procedural justice: voice-the ability to effectively
participate in the dispute resolution process. Finally, the hypothesis that a
technologically-consistent med-arb process would yield more positive
procedural justice experiences was not confirmed as a general rule. Rather, a
post-hoc analysis of the significant interactions confirmed it only in one
particular instance: participants who interacted with a (perceived) human
mediator experienced greater levels of procedural justice if their dispute was
subsequently considered by a human arbitrator rather than a software
arbitrator. The detailed findings of the two-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) of the four med-arb treatments (1-4, N=58)so are described below
and summarized in Tables 5-7.
2. MEDIATION M4N EFFECTS AND INTERACTIONS
The results largely confirm the "Adjusted Expectations" hypothesis.
EZSettle Participants had more favorable procedural justice experiences in
principal online mediation conducted by software than in instrumental mediation
by a human mediator, with an average difference in mean main-effect that
approaches one point on a seven-point scale. The results summarized in Table 5
indicate that EZSettle participants felt that principal mediation was fairer, allowed
them a stronger sense of participation/voice, and fostered greater levels of
interactional justice than instrumental mediation. Furthermore, subjects who
participated in principal mediation reported more positive evaluations of the
mediator's performance as well as their own experiences: The software mediator
was deemed more effective and attentive, and subjects felt greater certainty and
1
49 No significant differences were found between the overall evaluation of mediators
and arbitrators.
"5o No meaningful differences were found between mediation self-reports of subjects
in control groups 5-6 and the experimental groups 1-4. Thus, unless indicated otherwise,
the findings are based on an ANOVA of the four med-arb treatments (1-4, N=58).
Variations in the number of observations are mostly the result of missing responses to
specific questions; and in arbitration, some attrition (participants who settled the case in
mediation). No notable differences were found between the entire sample and the small
sub-group of participants who settled the dispute in mediation, possibly a result of the
relatively small sample size.
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less negative emotions in principal mediation. A marginally significant, result
indicates that participants also felt more empowered in principal mediation.
Overall, participants reported greater satisfaction with the principal mediation
process than with the instrumental mediation process.
Table 5: Mediation Main Effects
Software Human
Concept Measure Mediator Mediator Sig.
(SD) (SD)
Procedural 5.16 4.17 F(1, 54)=8.78,




patic- 5.75 4.44 54)=16.42,
(Voice) (0.77) (1.56) p<.000
(N=58)
Interactional
Justice Mediator 5.25 4.66 '=.050




Performance Mediator 5.22 4.51 p=.050
Effective- (1.32) (1.28) (N58)
ness
Disputant F(1, 54)=5.65,
Personal Certainty 4.23 3.32 p-.021
Experience (1.59) (1.25) (N=58)
Negative 3.71 4.79 F(, 53)7.18,
Affect (1.53) (1.43) (N57)
Process 4.6 3.61 F(1, 52)=8.62,
Satisfacti (1.38) (1.06) p=.005
on (N=56)
4.27 3.59 F(1, 53)=3.38,
Empower (1.46) (1.21) p-. 0 7 2
ment (N=57)
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3. ARBITRATION MAIN EFFECTS
The results are consistent with the "Reluctant Subordination" hypothesis,
which predicts people would prefer to subject themselves to the
decisioninaking power of a human arbitrator rather than to that of software.
Participants in instrumental arbitration reported experiencing a greater sense
of voice/participation as well as higher levels of informational justice.
Furthermore, the human arbitrator was deemed more respectful, and with
marginal significance also more trustworthy, than the software arbitrator.m'
Table 6: Arbitration Main Effects
Software Human
Concept Measure Arbitrator Arbitrator Sig.
(SD) (SD)
Particip- F(1,
Procedural ation 2.75 4.77 42)-13.67,
Justice (Voice) (1.94) (1.66) p-.001
(N-46)
Informational Inforna- 4.41 5.18 F(' 42)=5.27,
tional p-.027
Justice tice (1.27) (1.01)
Justice (N-46)
Arbitrator F(1, 42)=4.11,
Interactional Respect- 4.54 5.20 p=.049
Justice fulness(1.22) (0.95)
Arbitrator 4.54 4.91 F(1, 42)=3.23,
Trust- p=.079
worthness (1.41) (1.63)worthiness (N-46)
4. INTERACTIONS
Analysis of the significant and marginally significant interactions in the
experiment suggests that the "Consistent Technology" hypothesis" requires
further refinement and study. A post-hoc analysis revealed only one consistent
trend of simple main effects: subjects who participated in instrumental
15' Additional results that were not statistically significant (that were excluded from
Table 5 and 6) point to a similar trend with respect to participants' experiences of
instrumental and principal arbitration. For example: Arbitrator Fairness (5.06; 5.72);
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mediation preferred instrumental arbitration over principal arbitration. In other
words, in med-arb process in which a human mediator was involved, subjects
preferred that a human arbitrator-and not a software arbitrator-would issue
a final binding decision based on the information shared in mediation.
Specifically, participants in instrumental mediation reported experiencing
greater process control in mediation and greater process fairness in arbitration
when their case was later arbitrated by a human arbitrator rather than a
software arbitrator. Furthermore, subjects whose case was mediated by a
human mediator were under a stronger impression that the same rules were
applied to all parties if their case was later arbitrated by a human arbitrator,
and they felt not only that the arbitration process was more objectivel52 but
also that the outcome was fairer.
Table 7: Med-Arb Interaction Effects Given Instrumental Mediation (by
Human)
SimpleSoftware Human Min
Measure Arbitrator Arbitrator Mi
(Interaction Sig.) (SD) (SD) Effect
Sig.
Mediation Process Control 3.13 4.15 p-0.024
(F (1,54)-4.03, p-0.05) (1.57) (1.09)
Same Rules Applied to 4.64 5.90 p=0.04 7
Arbitration Parties (1.57) (1.28)
(F (1,41)=3.21, p-0.08 1 )
Arbitration Process Objectivity 4.18 5.40 p=0.084
(F (1,41)=4.42, p=0.042) (1.94) (1.08)
Outcome Fairness 3.40 4.69 p=0.056
(F (1,41)=4.42, p=0.062) (1.87) (1.73)
5. ANALYSIS
The findings are consistent with most of the theoretical predictions
regarding instrumental and principal online mediation and arbitration on a lean
text-based ODR system. The higher levels of procedural justice that were
reported in principal mediation are consistent with the "Adjusted
Expectations" hypothesis, driven by PAD, MRT, SPT and CASA Paradigm.
152 The composite measure of overall process fairness in arbitration was also
marginally significant (F (1,41)-4.42, interaction: p=0.062, main effect: p=0.089).
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It postulates that the relatively constrained and structured nature of online
interaction on EZSettle would have a greater negative impact on instrumental
mediation than on principal mediation because people have lower expectations
communicating with a software mediator compared to a human mediator. In
other words, given a lean text-based structured ODR process, disputants'
expectations about the mediation process are more likely to be failed in
instrumental mediation compared to principal mediation. The most striking
disparity in procedural experiences was observed in subjects' perceived ability
to participate in the process: they reported having almost 30% more voice in
principal mediation than in instrumental mediation. Indeed, on EZSettle's lean
text-based interface, parties felt more able to "present their side of the story"
and "express their views" if their input was considered by a software mediator
rather than a human mediator. This finding is important because in dispute
resolution contexts, people tend to judge procedures primarily in terms of
opportunities for input and consistency of treatment."' It is plausible that the
disparity in perceived voice drives differences in other dimensions, and in any
event, the results are consistent with the frequently replicated finding that
procedural justice, interactional justice, affect, and process satisfaction are
positively correlated.
The finding that participants had more positive procedural justice
experiences in instrumental arbitration by a human arbitrator compared to
principal arbitration by a software arbitrator is particularly striking given the
experiment design. While the mediation process on EZSettle entailed
significant interaction through information exchange, interest identification,
settlement offers and dynamic input from the mediator, the arbitration process
provided participants with very limited opportunities to form judgment. It
involved only minimal interaction: reviewing previously exchanged
information on a static webpage and awaiting the arbitrator's final
determination. Considering that the process and outcome were constant and
only the perceived nature of the arbitrator as human or software was
manipulated, the observed differences lend support to the rationale behind the
"Reluctant Subordination" and "Adjusted Expectations" hypotheses. They
suggest that disputant's perceptions, expectations and attributions about
interacting with software and human arbitrators greatly influence their
procedural justice experiences. A particularly striking finding in this respect is
that participants' felt substantially more "able to present their side of their
story" in instrumental arbitration (4.77) compared to arbitration by software
153 See Tyler, supra note 18, at 127. Tyler's finding is consistent with the finding of
this study in that a software mediator, which is not subject o most human decisionmaking
biases, may also be perceived as more consistent han a human mediator.
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(2.75), a 2-point difference reflecting a 73% increase in sense of participation
(voice). It also marks the difference between a positive sense of voice and a
negative sense of voice (bigger or smaller than 3.5 on a 7-point scale).
The finding that the human arbitrator was deemed clearer and more
respectful carries significant weight. Research on binding dispute resolution
procedures found that respectful treatment was the most important variable in
fairness evaluations.'54 Informational justice and interactional justice were
found to serve as heuristics for procedural justice judgments, especially in
instances where it is difficult to judge the quality of the process or outcome.'s
Such circumstances are typical for ODR (especially in private settings) and
were characteristic also f the experiment: participants had no knowledge of
how their outcome fares compared to others and received no explanation about
how and why the arbitrator reached the final decision. In such instances,
disputants' informational and interactional justice judgments are particularly
salient.
Finally, the observed interactions lend support to the importance of
expectations and consistency, albeit only in the context of a med-arb process
involving a human mediator. Through the prism of PAD, a multiple audience
problem arises when a communication needs to be designed "to
simultaneously convey different messages to different listeners."15 6 In
technologically inconsistent processes, disputants switch between human and
software third-parties (audiences). This switch can lead to a cognitive and
behavioral dissonance because it requires them to adjust their behavior to meet
their divergent expectations about such interactions, and it is likely to cause
frustration due to the perceived inability to maximize the benefits of each
process.i's The post-hoc analysis of the interaction effects provides some
support to the idea that disputants experience greater procedural justice when
15 See Lind et al., supra note 18 (discussing fairness experiences in courts).
155 See supra text and references accompanying note 70.
15 Krauss & Morsella, supra note 73, at 152.
17 For example, interacting with a software third-party, one may be less concerned
with appearing reasonable than when interacting with a human third-party. As a result, in
a med-arb process commencing with instrumental mediation one may make less
competitive offers to appear reasonable, which would seem disadvantageous if principal
arbitration follows, because in that case, absent motivations such as appearing reasonable,
one may have preferred making proposals that would maximize economic gains. See Lee
Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389, 400 (1991)
(noting that disputants wish "to appear reasonable and to cultivate the mediator's goodwill
... [by] compromis[ing] ... rather than striving for still more favorable terms."); Russell
Weiss, Some Economic Musings on Cybersettle,
38 U. TOL. L. REv. 89 (2006) (discussing potential game-theoretic manipulations in one
type of principal online arbitration: blind-bidding).
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the nature of their participation in instrumental mediation does not seem at
odds with their expectations about arbitration, as reflected in their preference
for a human arbitrator over automated arbitration by software. The fact that
this effect was detected only in med-arb processes that involve instrumental
mediation lends further support to the "Reluctant Subordination" hypothesis.
First, subjects whose case was mediated by a human mediator were later under
a stronger impression that the same rules were applied to all parties if their
case was later arbitrated by a human arbitrator. Second, they felt that the
arbitration process was more objective and that the outcome was fairer.
However, given the small number of significant results, these questions
require further study and development.
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
A. An Updated (Research) Agenda for ODR
World-over, there is a growing demand for designing effective and
appropriate ODR systems and instituting normative frameworks to govern
them."8 Within a decade's time it will likely be difficult to find an institutional
dispute resolution system that does not include, at the very least, an ODR
component.159 The trend of ODR institutionalization in mainstream dispute
resolution is apparent in civil justice reforms that include a component of
online courts and tribunals-such as in England, The Netherlands, the
Canadian province of British Columbial60 and international cross-border
dispute resolution initiatives.16 1 Accordingly, the issue now facing researchers,
practitioners and policy-makers is not whether to use ODR, but rather how to
best employ ODR. In this respect, it is no longer feasible, desirable, or useful
to regard ODR as a homogenous phenomenon. The task ahead is to develop a
particularistic understanding of the actual operation and effect of specific
ODR technologies and process designs.
This article reflects this updated research agenda. It takes the view that
ODR processes are an inevitable development, and aims to inform ODR
system design and regulation efforts. It replaces the traditional comparison
between face-to-face and online dispute resolution processes with an inter-
.ss See Sela, supra note 3.
s' See Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute
Systems Design, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 151, 152 (2012); Susskind, supra note 12;
Susskind, supra note 13.
" See supra text accompanying note 9; Sela, supra note 68.
161 See supra text accompanying note 10.
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ODR procedural comparison. The proposed analytical framework for the role
of technology in principal and instrumental binding and consensual ODR
processes, and the reported experiment results that examine it empirically,
sheds light on the important relationship between disputants, technology and
procedural justice
The results confirm the proposition that the degree of autonomy and
decision-control that an ODR technology possesses interact to affect
disputants' experiences of procedural justice. When mediation, a non-binding
dispute resolution process, is conducted on a lean text-based ODR system,
disputants experience greater procedural justice in a software-run principal
ODR process than in a human-facilitated instrumental ODR process. In
contrast, in arbitration, where the arbitrator renders a binding decision, a
human arbitrator in instrumental ODR appears more procedurally just.
Limited evidence suggests that in a two-tiered med-arb ODR process
commencing with instrumental mediation, disputants experience greater levels
of procedural justice and distributive justice if technologically-consistent
arbitration ensues, such that a human arbitrator renders the final decision and
not a software arbitrator.
Further research is required to examine the generalizability of the findings
to settings different from the one tested in the experiment. Nonetheless, since
most ODR systems currently rely on structured text-based processes, the
results are likely applicable to other comparable contexts.
B. Leveraging and Regulating the Role of Technology in
ODR
The findings portray a promising picture regarding both instrumental and
principal ODR: both technologies were shown to foster positive disputant
procedural justice experiences, 162 regardless of decision-control. At he same
time, the fact that instrumental and principal ODR processes each appeared
better-suited for a different dispute resolution process design confirms the
importance of looking at the role of ODR technology more intricately-
beyond the singular concept of the "fourth party"-to address the practical and
normative implications that they raise.
The continuous evolution of ODR technologies and implementations, as
well as the growing number of dispute resolution service providers-including
courts, governmental agencies and private entities-requires dispute system
designers and regulators to determine when it is appropriate to use each type
162 In both mediation and arbitration, both instrumental and principal ODR resulted in
an average score of procedural justice measures that was higher than 3.5/7.
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of ODR.16 To date, ODR scholarship justified automation primarily on the
grounds of cost-effectiveness, most commonly suggesting that using software
to replace human third-parties would be appropriate only for simple low-value
disputes.'" This article suggests that decision-control is another relevant
demarcation criterion.
Whether an ODR system serves as a communication platform for the
disputants and third-party or as an autonomous dispute resolution service
provider can be a helpful framework for discussing other related legal
questions. For example, do principal ODR platforms perform an unlicensed
practice of law?'6 5 Who owes ethical duties, bears professional responsibility
and can be found liable in disputes handled by a principal ODR system: the
software, its programmers, its dispute resolution system designers, the
institutional provider?1" The experiment results show that disputants are
sensitive to representations an ODR system makes about its role in the process.
The observed preference for principal ODR in mediation is an
encouraging signal for realizing much of the promise of ODR, and by
extension-other advisory legal technologies. Principal ODR technologies
enable less expensive, more efficient and consistent, treatment of disputes by
relieving pressure in procedural bottlenecks; eliminating dependencies on
limited physical and human resources, and introducing new qualities into the
163 See Lodder & Zeleznikow, supra note 111, at 12 (noting itht the goal of ODR
technologies "is not to develop computing paradigms but to use appropriately information
technology to support dispute resolution.").
1" See e.g., Colin Rule, Vikki Rogers & Louis F. Del Duca, Designing a Global
Consumer Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High
Volume Claims: OAS Developments, 42 UNIVERSAL COMMERCIAL CODE L. J. 221, 234,
255 (2010) (describing a proposal for an ODR system for low-value cross-border business-
to-consumer contract disputes); John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The
Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L. J. 893 (1999); Betancourt & Zlatanska, supra
note 25; Hornle, supra note 26. Some also emphasize the simplicity of the task. See
Carneiro et al., supra note 33, at 238 ("[F]ully autonomous ODR systems ... may not ...
be desirable, but there are many simple tasks that could be automated, releasing experts
for a different work.").
165 See Larson, supra note 30, at 548.
i See Steffen Wettig & Eberhard Zehendner, The Electronic Agent: A Legal
Personality under German Law? In: LEA 2003: THE LAW AND ELECTRONIC AGENTS (Anja
Oskamp & Emily M. Weitzenboeck, eds.) 97 (2003); Kamow, supra note 109, at 137
(discussing issues of liability in the context of distributed artificial intelligence); Lodder,
supra note 33, at 151 (discussing the practical and legal relationships between the
disputants, neutral, technology and technology provider in ODR); Larson, supra note 30,
at 546-547 (discussing responsibility for negligence in ODR); Shackleford & Raymond,
supra note 101, at 631-643.
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process.167 The fact that disputants reported a greater sense of procedural
justice in principal mediation helps in mitigating many of the concerns
associated with principal ODR.'68 It suggests that reliance on automation and
artificial intelligence in non-binding processes can be an appropriate means
for improving access to justice and redress.
Naturally, the receptiveness of disputants to ODR does not remove the
need to monitor such applications. Whether or not they control the outcome,
ODR technologies are not neutral: the values imbedded in the software code
reflect specific normative choices, which can affect, implicitly and explicitly,
the process and outcome.'69 Oversight is particularly important in principal
ODR processes: absent any procedural supervision by a human-third party,
ODR system designers and regulators must be transparent about their
technological choices and guarantee that they protect, rather than erode,
fundamental values.17 ' Adherence to this duty may well determine whether
policymaking in this area will adopt an instrumentalist or substantive approach
to ODR,"' and accordingly, whether the full potential of ODR can be realized.
C. Practical Implications
The fact that principal ODR systems, with their accessibility, operational
and cost-effectiveness advantages, can be employed in certain circumstances
without infringing on their users' procedural justice experiences (compared to
an instrumental process) paves the way for many interesting applications.'72
Notably, ODR systems may present the first viable means for realizing
Sander's vision of the multi-door courthouse. Sander envisioned an institution
167 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13, 35-37. See also Philip Leith, IT and
Law, and Law Schools, 14 INT'L REV. OF L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 171, 178 (2000)
("[M]achines can be built which will either support. . . decision making or carry out tasks
which are currently time consuming or expensive.").
168 See supra text accompanying notes 24-25, 101-103, 107-109.
169 See supra notes 29-30, 110 and accompanying text.
170 See also Yochai Benkler, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 17-18 (2006) ("There is no guarantee that . . .
information technology will lead to. . . improvements in innovation, freedom and justice .
... That is a choice we face as society. The way we develop will, in significant measure,
depend on choices we make in the next decade or so.").
171 See the discussion accompanying footnotes 107-110.
1". Many recognize this potential, see, e.g., Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 159,
at 152 ("Pairing remarkable information processes tools with an information intensive
activity such as DSD should lead to new opportunities to craft more effective and efficient
dispute resolution and prevention systems.").
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that would provide a solution for many of the fundamental problems in the
administration ofjustice, by offering
[A] flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution
processes, with particular types of cases being assigned to
differing processes (or combination of processes), according
to some . .. criteria .. . [A] Dispute Resolution Center, where
the grievant would first be channeled through a screening
clerk who would then direct him to the process (or sequence
of processes) most appropriate to his type of case.17 1
Throughout the years, many models of the multi-door courthouse
emerged, but they are all challenged by the absence of a practical method for
screening and directing cases to a particular process.'74 ODR systems could be
a solution: they make it relatively easy to combine or switch between processes
(negotiation, mediation, arbitration, adjudication; single neutral or a multi-
neutral panel, etc.),'7 5 and technologies (principal vs. instrumental, text vs.
video, synchronous vs. asynchronous, etc.).176 Furthermore, ODR systems
offer unprecedented flexibility in creating multiple tailored process designs.
The experiment findings suggest that certain capacities, such as the work of
Sander's "clerk," can be automated without denying disputants a sense of
procedural justice.177 Principal ODR modules can conduct case screening and
routing, directed negotiation, mediation and certain forms of early neutral
evaluation; instrumental ODR can be used for processes such as arbitration or
adjudication. Dispute resolution systems could thus offer parties the option to
transition between different procedural alternatives to meet their changing
"7 Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties ofDispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 65,
at 83-84 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler, eds., 1979).
174 Barry Edwards, Renovating the Multi-Door Courthouse: Designing Trial Court
Dispute Resolution Systems to Improve Results and Control Costs, 18 HARv. NEGOT. L.
REv. 281, 322 (2013).
1'
7 See Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 159, at 162 (discussing potential impacts
of ODR on dispute resolution system design, and suggesting, among other things "the
blurring of boundaries within process types" and "new types of processes and variations
within each familiar category of processes," concluding that "boundaries are constantly
being challenged and become more diffuse and flexible").
'76 See Sela, supra note 3.
177 In fact, the results suggest hat from disputants' perspective, principal ODR may
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needs, at a lower cost relative to in-person or instrumental ODR options. The
finding that parties experienced reduced procedural justice when transitioning
from instrumental mediation to principal arbitration suggests, however,
that a multi-door flexible ODR system should avoid instituting facilitative
instrumental processes that progress to binding principal processes unless they
devise strategies to mitigate the expected decrease in procedural justice levels
that is associated with this process design.
Providing the option to conduct non-binding dispute resolution processes
on principal ODR platforms can positively impact the accessibility and
delivery of many dispute resolution services that would benefit from the cost-
savings, increased volumes, and improved timeliness associated with
automation. Most straightforwardly, principal ODR can level the playing field
for disputants that cannot overcome certain barriers that characterize face-to-
face dispute resolution services or even instrumental ODR, such as service
fees, availability during business hours, or physical accessibility. Principal
ODR processes could also transform the way certain disputes are handled. For
example, principal ODR can be used to individually handle certain classes of
disputes that are currently mostly addressed by collective mechanisms uch as
class-action, because it offers an alternative viable pathway for pursuing some
of these claims, by overcoming barriers related to the cost/gain ratio or
effectively reaching claimants without aggregation.
Finally, the findings bear practical implications to those involved in
designing, operating, using, or regulating ODR systems. They show that
variations in decision-control and software autonomy can be used to improve
disputants' procedural justice experiences. Optimizing procedural justice
experiences has important implications: regardless of outcome,' procedural
justice strongly influences disputants' satisfaction with, evaluation of,
preference for, and affect toward dispute resolution systems.17 ' It also impacts
"' For a discussion of the empirical relationship between distributive and procedural
justice, see Hauenstein et al., supra note 130.; See also Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E.
Spector, The Role of Justice in Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 86 ORG . BEHAV. HuM.
DECISION PROCESSES 278 (2001); Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A
Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 425 (2001).
179 See Thibaut & Walker, supra note 64; E. Allan Lind, The Psychology ofCourtroom
Procedure, in PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 13 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray,
eds., 1982); Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of
Their Courtroom Experience, 18 L. & SOC'Y REV. 51 (1984); Jean M. Landis & Lynne
Goodstein, When Is Justice Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus
Procedure Debate, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 675 (1986).
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evaluations of the institutions responsible for resolving disputes,"' the
perceived legitimacy of the decisionmaker,'"' decision acceptance,182 and
long-term adherence to agreements.8" Since online service providers
oftentimes lack enforcement mechanisms and reliable reputational cues, an
informed design choice of instrumental and principal ODR services can
significantly increase the voluntary enforceability of resolutions and the
providers' institutional legitimacy. When the ODR service is provided by an
online business intermediary such as e-Bay's Resolution Center18 (an e-
commerce marketplace) or Freelancer's online arbitration service' (a
freelancing marketplace) an increase in procedural justice experiences may
entail significant economic implications: contributing to a trustworthy and
satisfying environment hat attracts users.186
D. Final Remarks
This article follows a "demand-side" approach to evaluating ODR, that is:
building a framework and methodology for capturing the perspective of end-
users of ODR.'18 It underscores the importance of accounting for disputants'
Iso Tyler, supra note 18, at 103-104; Robert Folger & Mary A. Konovsky, Effects of
Procedural and Distributive Justice on Reactions to Pay Raise Decisions, 32 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 115 (1989).
181 See Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect ofFair Decisionmaking
Procedures on the Legitimacy of Government 28 L. & SoC'Y REv 809 (1994).
182 Tyler & Huo, supra note 78, at 55 (finding that procedural justice "has more
influence than does outcome fairness . . . or outcome favorability"). See also Tyler, supra
note 18, at 104.
18 See e.g., Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in Mediation 17 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 313 (1993); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Goal Achievement, Procedural Justice, and the
Success ofMediation, 1 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 33 (1990).
' See eBay, supra note 49.
8 See FREELANCER, http://www.freelancer.com/faq/topic.php?id=25 (last visited
Aug. 28, 2017).
1' Many believe that a global ODR system or a network of regulated private ODR
systems is a necessary mechanism for removing barriers to international e-commerce and
business. See e.g., Vikki Rogers, Knitting the Security Blanket for New Market
Opportunities, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 95 (Mohamed S.
Abdel Wahab et al., eds., 2012); Colin Rule, Louis F. Del Duca & Daniel Nagel, Online
Small Claim Dispute Resolution Developments-Progress on a Soft Law for Cross-Border
Consumer Sales and the Development of a Global Consumer Law Forum, 43 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE L. J. 419 (2010); Rule et al., supra note 164.
18. See Martin Gramatikov, Methodological Challenges in Measuring Cost and
Quality of Access to Justice, TISCO Working Paper Series on Civil Law and Conflict
Resolution Systems 3, 7 (2007),
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perspective to guarantee appropriate and effective dispute resolution system
design. However, whether the perceptions of technology end-users should be
the focus of legal normative or regulatory discussions is a subject of debate."
One may doubt the desirability, altogether, of basing any prescriptive
normative position on people's intuitive perceptual reactions, especially when
they are gleaned from an experiment.' One response is that like other societal
institutions that constrain individual conduct, the legitimacy and authority of
dispute resolution mechanisms depends on their reflecting their constituents'
values and preferences.'90
Naturally, disputants' subjective procedural justice experiences should not
be the sole normative consideration in the design and regulation of ODR.
Attitudes are amenable to manipulation and can create an appearance of
procedural fairness through provision of perceived dignity, respect, and voice
that could distract disputants from outcomes that are substantively or
normatively unfair by other criteria.'9 ' Objective justice criteria should also
guide dispute system design, for example by creating processes that maximize
the amount and quality of relevant information available to the decisionmaker
or minimizing bias in the way evidence is presented.'92 Principal ODR
processes involve an inherent risk for embedded bias and tradeoffs between
objective and subjective procedural justice. Powered by big-data and modeling
capabilities, principal ODR systems can tailor the process and outcome to what
a particular disputant is likely to subjectively perceive as fair,' 9 3 regardless of
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=1099392 (explaining the difference
between "demand side" and "supply side" research which discusses how legal institutions
practice and interpret the concept of access to justice).
1' Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technology, Commerce, Development, Identity, 8 MINN.
J. L. Sci. & TECH. 515, 531 (2007) ("Rarely is a technology user's perception or
development presented as a focus of the overall regulatory picture . . . [but perhaps] the
regulatory focus should move away from regulating the technology itself and move toward
regulating the ways human interact with technology tools.").
189 See Mark Kelman, Intuitions, 65 STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1296-1297 (2013) ("The. .
proposition-that intuitions, however intuitions are defined, count a great deal if our goal
is to determine what is truly normatively desirable . . . -is extremely controversial");
Hayden & Anderson, supra note 116.
190 Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey
Evidence, 11 L. & Soc'Y REv. 427, 430 (1977) ("[ljt would be strange, indeed, to call a
legal system democratic if its procedures and operations were greatly at odds with the
values, preferences, or desires of the citizens.").
191 MacCoun, supra note 63, at 189.
19 See Lind & Tyler, supra note 131, at 18-26 (discussing objective justice criteria
and their limitations).
19' Process personalization can be achieved either by directly capturing the disputant's
characteristics, preferences and behavior or by statistically approximating them.
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objective standards.194 While such deferential treatment has the potential to
maximize subjective procedural justice experiences, it may disadvantage less
savvy disputants and it is at odds with fundamental values of equal and
consistent reatment.
In considering the empirical findings of this study, one should be mindful
of the sensitivity of procedural justice judgments to context. The participants
in this experiment were Stanford University students-likely more literate and
tech-savvy than the general population. They engaged in an ODR process on
a lean text-based, semi-synchronous ystem, to resolve an e-commerce dispute
with an anonymous seller without any reputational cues. Furthermore, the
methodological considerations that justified using a med-arb process design in
the experiment naturally affect the findings about each phase of the process.
Principal and instrumental ODR processes should be tested in other contexts,
using different system designs, research populations (especially less tech-
savvy ones) and communication technologies.
Finally, the normative desirability of different ODR processes is a product
of the system's functional competence and people's perceptions about it. The
ever-growing immersion of human life in online technologies, and the rapid-
pace of technological advancement, suggest that disputants' attitudes and
experiences in ODR will continue to evolve over time.
1 Rule, supra note 51, at 11 (for example, "eBay has total visibility into each user's
usage patterns, history, and account data," which it can use not only to monitor and
improve the ODR process, but also to propose different resolutions to users based on how
valuable they are to eBay as revenue generators). See also Bostrom & Yudkowsky, supra
note 102; Weiss, supra note 157; (discussing different potential manipulations to Al
powered systems that can have unethical consequences); see also Shackelford & Raymond,
supra note 101, at 635 ("[A]ny Al algorithm that seeks to replace even a minor portion of
the justice system must be made robust against manipulation, which of course includes the
ability of the business to alter outcomes and/or alter the decisionmaking process. . . .").
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APPENDIX: FACTOR ANALYSIS
Table 8: Factor A alysis of Composite Measures
Measure Indicators Eigenvalue Reliability*




Process was fair (degree)
Rules applied to parties
(same--different)
Participation Able to express views 1.6 0.89
(Voice) (agree/disagree)
Parties could present their
side (agree/disagree)
Process My views were 1.37 0.83
Control considered in process
(agree/disagree)
I controlled the process
(degree)
Decision My needs were 1.6 0.89
Control considered in the
outcome (agree/disagree)
My influence over the
outcome (none--a lot)
Neutral Neutral was (Attentive-- 1.43 0.85
Attentiveness Not attentive)
Mediator listened when I
expressed my views
(agree/disagree)
Neutral Neutral was (respectful- 1.54 0.87
Respectfulness disrespectful)
Neutral treated me with
respect (agree/disagree)
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Measure Indicators Eigenvalue Reliability*
Informational Neutral was (clear- 1.31 0.81
Justice confusing)
Neutral explained the
process (not at all-fully)



























I felt in the process
(hopeless--hopeful)
* Reliability values for 2-items indices: correlation coefficient; for
35items indices: Chronbach's Alpha statistic.
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